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EEC-SENTINAL 247 — WARGAME SIMULATION REPORT

Scenario: Operation IRON CONFLUENCE: Multi-Theater NATO–Russia/Iran Contested Campaign (Baltic / Ukraine / Gulf) Theater: Multi-Theater: Eastern Europe (Baltic / Ukraine Front) + Middle East (Persian Gulf / Strait of Hormuz) Tier: STRATEGIC
Iterations: 1,000,000 Generated: Mon, 17 Aug 2026 01:21:03 GMT

1. PRIMARY OUTCOME

Contested Stalemate	Probability: 49% — Timeline: 3-4 days (median 4) — Confidence: HIGH — TSS: 56.5
	Victory Condition: No single actor achieves war-termination conditions across all three theaters within the modeled campaign window. Russian A2/AD denial in the Baltic precludes NATO operational success there; near-parity attritional dynamics along the Ukraine front prevent breakthrough; decisive US naval overmatch in the Gulf is offset by Iranian asymmetric denial costs. Campaign resolution is projected within 3–4 days at the single-engagement level (median 4 days) but overall campaign duration is bounded by the slowest theater (Gulf, 47–72 days). The bottleneck theater — Baltic, TSS 47.5 — limits campaign success to stalemate despite Gulf-theater tactical BLUFOR advantage.

2. OUTCOME PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION

Outcome	Prob	Dist	Rationale & Key Dependency
Contested Stalemate — No actor achieves war-termination conditions; lines harden across all three theaters with neither side able to consolidate gains or impose decisive defeat	49%		Russian A2/AD dominance in the Baltic (TSS 47.5, BLUFOR victory only 2.8%) anchors the campaign in stalemate regardless of Gulf-theater BLUFOR success; the non-compensatory multi-theater evaluation means decisive Gulf outcomes cannot offset Baltic failure. Near-attritional parity on the Ukraine front (TSS 54.1) reinforces deadlock at the strategic level. Depends on: NATO coalition cohesion and the sustained flow of reinforcements through the Suwalki Gap corridor under Russian fires and Kaliningrad-based A2/AD threat
BLUFOR/Coalition Operational Victory — NATO and US forces achieve operational success in at least two of three theaters; Russia and Iran unable to consolidate strategic gains	35%		Realized primarily in the Gulf theater (TSS 63.3, BLUFOR victory 73.8%) where US naval and air superiority over Iran is decisive, with partial traction on the Ukraine front; Baltic theater failure caps the aggregate outcome below campaign victory. Requires sustained coalition commitment and functioning precision-strike logistics chains. Depends on: Maintenance of US carrier strike group freedom of maneuver in the Gulf and uninterrupted Hormuz transit for strike package sustainment
Major Escalation Beyond Modeled Scope — Russian NSNW signaling crosses into employment, or Iranian proxy action triggers a third-party	15%		Russia's operationalized escalate-to-de-escalate doctrine — reinforced by May 2026 nuclear force exercises explicitly rehearsing nuclear response to conventional attack — creates a persistent 14.8%


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state entry, expanding the conflict beyond the three-theater model

escalation tail, particularly if Baltic losses trigger Kremlin reassessment of conventional viability. Doubling miscalculation risk shifts stalemate probability from 49.2% to 41.9%, pushing probability mass toward this bucket.

Depends on: Russian Kremlin decision calculus under conventional battlefield pressure, particularly if Kaliningrad A2/AD nodes are struck directly by NATO precision fires

OPFOR Strategic Advantage / Consolidation — Russia or Iran achieves fait accompli in at least one theater and negotiates from a position of strength before NATO can reconstitute a credible response

1% 

The near-zero probability (0.7%) reflects the baseline scenario's low fait-accomplish initialization signal (0.06); however, Red-cell COA RED-3 'Maximum Fait Accomplish' collapses BLUFOR operational victory probability from 35.3% to 3.3%, demonstrating this bucket's extreme sensitivity to Russian pre-hostilities positioning — planners must treat the RED-3 case as the planning baseline, not the base run.

Depends on: Speed and decisiveness of Russian initial maneuver in the Baltic before NATO Forward Land Forces elements can mass and channel reinforcements through the Suwalki corridor

3. FORCE ASSESSMENT

BLUFOR: NATO / US-led Coalition (EUCOM + CENTCOM + INDOPACOM contributors)

Readiness: 80% | NCI: 3/5 | Sig: MEDIUM

Logistics: Class-M at ~75% aggregate; Class-E AMBER in Baltic theater due to high consumption rates; Gulf sustainment corridor rated GREEN with two CSGs (USS Abraham Lincoln, USS George H.W. Bush) plus ARG USS Boxer forward-deployed; Ukrainian front Class-S strained by extended LOC through Poland

+ Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO): F-35A/B/C, EA-18G Growler, RQ-4 Global Hawk ISR enabling integrated strike across all domains | + Precision stand-off strike: TLAM Block V, JASSM-ER, GBU-72 5,000-lb penetrator munitions for hardened target defeat | + Baltic multi-domain: multinational battlegroups at Orzysz (US-led) and Rukla (German 45th Armoured Brigade); Poland Eastern Shield fortifications ~38% complete as of mid-2026 | + Gulf naval supremacy: three CSGs in CENTCOM AOR, 14+ guided-missile destroyers (Arleigh Burke-class), AGM-114 Hellfire-armed surface interdiction platforms | + SIGINT/cyber overmatch via NSA-CYBERCOM coordinated operations; NCI advantage over OPFOR at theater level

! Suwalki Gap resupply corridor rated 55% interdiction risk — Kaliningrad Iskander-M, S-400, and Russian FPV drones threaten the 65-km land bridge; Baltic reinforcement timeline exceeds Russian fait-accomplish window | ! NCI rating 3 of 5: coalition C2 interoperability is degraded by multi-nation data-link integration gaps and Russian GRU cyber operations targeting EUCOM networks; Gulf and Baltic theaters compete for ISR and strike assets | ! Coalition consensus fragility: ROE constraints and

OPFOR: Russian Federation Armed Forces (Western MD / Baltic Fleet) + Iran IRGC Navy (Gulf theater)

Readiness: 80% | NCI: 2/5 | Sig: MEDIUM

Logistics: Class-M at ~80%; Russian Western MD internally lines of supply intact via rail from St. Petersburg and Pskov; Kaliningrad exclave is a logistics island dependent on Baltic Sea LOC now partially threatened by Swedish and Finnish NATO membership; IRGC Gulf logistics shore-based but critically degraded — underground cruise-missile bunkers near Hormuz destroyed by GBU-72 strikes (March 2026)

+ A2/AD complex: Kaliningrad hosts S-400 SAM, Iskander-M (nuclear-capable, 12+ launchers), Oniks and Kh-35 anti-ship missiles (range 300 km); Baltic Fleet Kilo-class submarines for sea-denial | + Massed fires and reflexive control: 1st Guards Tank Army-equivalent echelons supported by BM-30 Smerch MLRS, Tornado-G, and TOS-1A thermobaric systems on Ukrainian front; non-strategic nuclear weapon (NSNW) signalling as escalation management tool | + Rapid fait-accomplish doctrine: pre-positioned VDV (airborne) elements in Belarus theater for potential Suwalki axis seizure within operational surprise window | + Iranian asymmetric denial: IRGC fast-boat swarm tactics, Houthis-pattern UAS/USV harassment, mine-laying in Hormuz Strait narrows (26.5°N, 56.5°E corridor)

! Kaliningrad exclave isolation: with Finland and Sweden in NATO, Baltic Sea transit for reinforcement is now alliance-contested; rail transit via Lithuania politically severed in crisis | ! Ukraine-front sustainment: extended frontage degrades artillery ammunition replenishment; ATACMS and Storm Shadow strikes on Russian

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enemies' assets, particularly strikes into Kaliningrad proper	attrition across all iterations reached 12.6% of initial strength (mean 21.2%) — well below the 55% breakpoint threshold, indicating the force remains combat-effective but is progressively degraded ! IRGC conventional naval force is decisively outmatched in the Gulf; Iran has no credible answer to three CSGs; asymmetric denial imposes cost but cannot achieve sea control

4. TERRAIN & THEATER ANALYSIS

Dominant Terrain	Three operationally distinct theaters: (1) BALTIC — low-relief glaciated plain bisected by the Suwalki corridor (54.1°N, 22.9°E); forested and lake-dotted terrain north of Augustów limits armored maneuver off-road, canalizing forces onto Highway Via Baltica and rail axes. (2) UKRAINE — open steppe and Dnipro river valley; urban rubble belts (Zaporizhzhia, Kherson axis) provide OPFOR prepared defense advantage. (3) GULF — open water with narrow chokepoint at Strait of Hormuz (minimum navigable width ~3.2 km at Larak Island); Iranian coastal mountains (Zagros foothills) provide radar masking for shore-based ASM batteries.
Movement Friction	Baltic theater trafficability is MEDIUM-LOW for heavy armor (>40 tonnes) off-road due to saturated post-winter ground and extensive water obstacles; Gulf theater naval movement is HIGH friction in confined Hormuz narrows; Ukraine theater open steppe supports armored movement but OPFOR prepared positions along the Orikhiv–Tokmak axis impose HIGH friction on BLUFOR offensive action.
Weather Modifier	Baltic: August conditions favor reduced mud friction but morning fog banks over the Gulf of Finland (59.5°N, 24.8°E) degrade rotary-wing ISR by 15-20% in early-day windows; Gulf: summer shamal winds (25-35 kt, seasonal June–August) create dust and sea-state 3-4 conditions that degrade IRGC small-boat operations and reduce UAV persistence by ~30%.
Infrastructure Risk	Via Baltica (E67) highway and Rail Baltica corridor through Suwalki are primary BLUFOR LOC nodes at existential risk from Iskander-M and FPV drone interdiction; Kharg Island oil terminal (29.2°N, 50.3°E) in Gulf theater is a strategic economic node whose interdiction risk shapes coalition political sustainability calculations.

5. MOST PROBABLE COURSE OF ACTION: CONTESTED ATTRITION ACROSS THREE SIMULTANEOUS THEATERS

NATO and US-led coalition forces engage Russian and Iranian adversaries across Baltic, Ukrainian, and Gulf theaters simultaneously, with each theater following its own tempo and resolution timeline. No single decisive action terminates the campaign; instead, a combination of Russian A2/AD denial in the Baltic, attritional near-parity on the Ukrainian front, and US naval overmatch in the Gulf produces a fragmented strategic outcome ranging from BLUFOR advantage in the south to contested stalemate in the north.

WHAT HAPPENS, IN ORDER

At D+0, Russian Iskander-M launches from Kaliningrad's 152nd Missile Brigade strike the Suwalki Gap road and rail network and Orzysz battlegroup staging areas, simultaneously depressing BLUFOR NCI through GRU cyber operations against NATO C2 nodes in Mons and Ramstein; this opening barrage exploits the front-loaded phase-strength curve that gives Russian fires their greatest effect in Phase 1, when OPFOR combat power is at its 1.15x

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Panzerbrigade 45 elements at Rukia — have absorbed significant attrition attempting to hold the corridor under constant Iskander, Tornado-S MLRS, and fiber-optic FPV drone pressure; the corridor remains physically open but operationally contested, consistent with the IISS assessment that Russia need not capture the Gap to neutralize it. In the Ukrainian theater, Russia's 25th Combined Arms Army (Central Military District) presses the Pokrovsk axis with combined Su-34 glide-bomb strikes and 8th Combined Arms Army armor, while Ukraine's 7th Air Assault Corps stages a local southern-front counterpush that freezes Russian redeployment, keeping both sides near attritional parity through D+5 and explaining the Ukraine theater TSS of 54.1. Concurrently in the Gulf, USS George H.W. Bush and USS George Washington carrier strike groups enforce the naval blockade of Iranian ports, neutralizing IRGC surface and mine-warfare threats through sustained F/A-18E/F sorties and MH-60R minehunting operations; Iranian conventional forces have no answer to dual-CSG air superiority, producing the Gulf's 73.8% BLUFOR victory probability, though asymmetric mine and fast-boat harassment sustains friction through D+59. By D+12–17 in the Baltic, Russian fires culminate as Phase 1 strength decays to its 0.85x Phase 3 multiplier and sustainment fragility (x1.25 modifier) bites into Kaliningrad's missile stockpile; NATO reinforcements begin flowing through a degraded but intact Suwalki corridor, locking the theater into contested stalemate rather than Russian consolidation, and producing the campaign's binding bottleneck TSS of 47.5. Campaign closure is bounded by the Gulf theater's resolution timeline of 47–72 days (median 59), not by Baltic or Ukrainian tempo; until Iranian asymmetric denial is exhausted and diplomatic off-ramps solidify, the campaign remains open and the 49.2% Contested Stalemate outcome reflects the inability of any single theater success to compensate for the Baltic's intractable corridor problem.

Phase 1: Phase 1 — Russian Fires Surge / Baltic Corridor Interdiction

D+0 → D+2 — **OPFOR (Russia)** dominates | Concept: Reflexive Control / Escalate-to-de-escalate opening strike; A2/AD bubble activation from Kaliningrad

Russia's 152nd Missile Brigade (Kaliningrad) fires Iskander-M ballistic missiles against Suwalki Gap road junctions, Orzysz staging areas, and NATO air-defense radar sites in northeast Poland. Simultaneously, GRU Sandworm-affiliated cyber units execute destructive wiper operations against SACEUR C2 networks, elevating BLUFOR NCI from 3 toward 4.

Logistics: Class-E CRITICAL (Iskander-M reload cycle ~hours; Tornado-S MLRS tubes burning through PGM stocks rapidly)
Attrition: BLUFOR 10-15% (eFP battlegroups); OPFOR 3-6% (counter-battery and F-35A SEAD sorties from Łask AB)

- D+0H2 Iskander-M strike — Suwalki road junction [strike] (Iskander-M (9M723) ballistic missile) — Road bridge and forward assembly area at Suwalki junction struck; NATO reinforcement flow along the E67 corridor interrupted for 18-24 hours.
- D+0H3 GRU cyber strike — SACEUR C2 nodes [cyber] (Destructive wiper malware (NotPetya-lineage)) — SACEUR Mons HQ and Ramstein relay nodes suffer partial C2 outage, degrading BLUFOR NCI and delaying NATO CAS coordination by 4-6 hours.
- D+0H6 Tornado-S MLRS saturation — Orzysz battlegroup [strike] (9M55K Tornado-S cluster MLRS) — US-led multinational battlegroup staging area at Orzysz suppressed; armored vehicle concentration takes 12-18% materiel attrition in Phase 1 opening barrage.
- D+1H10 NATO SEAD — F-35A strike on Kaliningrad radar sites [air] (AGM-88E AARGM-ER) — Two S-400 Triumf engagement radars near Kaliningrad degraded, temporarily opening a SEAD corridor for follow-on NATO CAS sorties over the Suwalki Gap.
- D+1H20 Baltic Fleet anti-ship sortie — Gulf of Gdansk [naval_op] (Kh-35 Uran anti-ship missile) — NATO fast logistics vessel diverted from Gdynia transit; sea-lane reinforcement of eFP battlegroups via Baltic temporarily contested.

→ **152nd Missile Brigade (Iskander-M)** [Brigade] (OPFOR) OR:95%

→ **NATO eFP Battlegroup Poland (US-led, Orzysz)** [Brigade] (BLUFOR) OR:78%

→ **Russian Baltic Fleet Surface Action Group** [Fleet] (OPFOR) OR:82%

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D+2 → D+14 — **CONTESTED** dominates | Concept: Russian massed artillery + FPV attrition / NATO Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) precision counter-battery and ISR shaping

Baltic corridor fighting locks into positional attrition as NATO reinforcements flow through a degraded Suwalki Gap under continuous Tornado-S and fiber-optic FPV drone interdiction; Russian force effectiveness decays to its 1.0x phase multiplier as Iskander-M stocks thin and sustainment fragility compounds. In Ukraine, the 8th Combined Arms Army and 25th CAA maintain pressure on the Pokrovsk axis while Ukraine's 82nd Air Assault Brigade and 95th Air Assault Brigade execute the southern Dnipropetrovsk counterpush, producing near-attritional parity.

Logistics: Class-M HIGH (both sides); Class-E MEDIUM-HIGH (NATO drawing ATACMS reserves; Russia rationing Iskander reloads) Attrition: BLUFOR 8-14% additional (cumulative ~22-28%); OPFOR 12-18% additional (cumulative ~18-24%) — LER 0.71 reflects BLUFOR taking proportionally heavier fractional losses

- D+3H8 ATACMS strike — Kaliningrad logistics depot [strike] (MGM-140 ATACMS Block IA) — Fuel and ammunition depot on Kaliningrad periphery struck, partially disrupting Iskander-M resupply cycle and degrading Phase 2 OPFOR fires tempo.
 - D+5H14 Ukraine southern counterpush — Dnipropetrovsk axis [air] (FPV drones / Storm Shadow (SCALP-EG)) — 82nd Air Assault Brigade advances 4-6 km, fixing Russian 36th and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigades and preventing redeployment to other axes.
 - D+7H6 Gulf — dual-CSG air campaign against IRGC mine-layers [naval_op] (AGM-84 Harpoon / MH-60R Seahawk minehunting) — IRGC fast-attack craft and mine-laying vessels suppressed in Strait of Hormuz narrows; commercial transit disruption maintained but BLUFOR sea-lane control incrementally asserted.
 - D+10 Russian NSNW signaling — Kaliningrad Iskander-M demonstration shot (inert warhead, North Sea) [declaration] (Iskander-M (9M723) — inert demonstrator) — Reflexive control escalation signal fires one Iskander-M into North Sea exclusive economic zone; NATO Political strain index climbs and triggers emergency NAC session, temporarily slowing ROE escalation ladder.
- **Panzerbrigade 45 (German-led, Rukla)** [Brigade] (BLUFOR) OR:72%
- **7th Air Assault Corps (Ukraine)** [Division] (BLUFOR) OR:76%
- **USS George Washington (CVN-73) CSG** [Fleet] (BLUFOR) OR:88%

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D+14 → D+59 — **BLUFOR (Gulf) / CONTESTED (Baltic, Ukraine)** dominates | Concept: NATO JADO sustained precision strike + ISR overmatch; Russian fait-accomplish-to-negotiation transition attempt; USN sea-control enforcement in Strait of Hormuz

Russian fires in the Baltic decay to the 0.85x phase-3 strength multiplier as Iskander-M and Tornado-S stocks deplete under sustainment fragility (x1.25); NATO corridor throughput recovers enough to prevent Russian consolidation but not enough to restore full eFP readiness, locking the theater in Contested Stalemate at TSS 47.5. Gulf theater closes on the median 59-day bound as Iranian IRGC conventional resistance collapses under continuous dual-CSG air pressure and US blockade attrition, but asymmetric mine and proxy harassment ensures the campaign does not formally terminate before the Gulf resolves.

Logistics: Class-M MEDIUM (Russian sustainment fragility dominant constraint); Class-E LOW-MEDIUM (both sides rationing precision munitions) Attrition: BLUFOR additional 4-8% (cumulative ~30-36%); OPFOR additional 8-14% (cumulative ~30-38%) — peak mean attrition 21.2% per simulation; 55% breakpoint threshold not approached

- D+17H12 Kaliningrad fires culmination — OPFOR MLRS battery depleted [logistics] (N/A (logistics culmination event)) — Tornado-S MLRS batteries in Kaliningrad exhaust forward PGM loads; sortie rate drops 60%, allowing partial NATO Suwalki corridor throughput restoration.
- D+28 Kremlin reflexive control — ceasefire proposal, Baltic theater [declaration] (N/A (political signal)) — Russia proposes bilateral ceasefire in Baltic theater from position of partial territorial leverage; NATO NAC split on response, raising political strain and reinforcing stalemate probability.
- D+52H6 Strait of Hormuz — IRGC naval resistance collapses [naval_op] (MH-60S Knighthawk / AN/AQS- 20 mine-neutralization system) — Final IRGC fast-boat and mine-warfare resistance suppressed in Hormuz narrows; commercial transit begins partial restoration under USN escort, bounding campaign closure at day 52-59.
- **USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) CSG [Fleet]** (BLUFOR) OR:91%
- **8th Combined Arms Army (Pokrovsk axis) [Division]** (OPFOR) OR:71%
- **ACE Mobile Force Land (NATO reinforcement package) [Brigade]** (BLUFOR) OR:80%

6. LOGISTICS ASSESSMENT

Class-M Days 18	Class-E Days 11	Interdiction Risk HIGH
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BLUFOR Corridor: Primary Baltic corridor: Via Baltica / Rail Baltica through Suwalki Gap rated AMBER-RED — 55% interdiction risk from Kaliningrad fires and Belarusian axis; NATO relies on pre-positioned Class-E stocks at Powidz AB (52.4°N, 17.9°E) and Orzysz (53.8°N, 21.9°E) as forward supply points. Gulf corridor: sea lines of communication through Red Sea and Arabian Sea remain GREEN, supported by Diego Garcia (7.3°S, 72.4°E) as deep rear staging node and Al Udeid AB (25.1°N, 51.3°E) for Class-E aviation ordnance.

OPFOR Corridor: Russian Western MD: interior LOC via Pskov–Narva and Minsk–Brest rail axes is assessed SECURE; Kaliningrad exclave corridor is AMBER given Baltic Sea interdiction threat from Finnish and Swedish naval assets post-NATO accession. Iranian IRGC: shore-based logistics at Bandar Abbas (27.2°N, 56.3°E) are degraded following GBU-72 strikes on underground bunkers; Class-E (ASM/USV) replenishment estimated at 40-60% of pre-conflict baseline.

⚠ At Risk: Suwalki rail junction and E67 highway bridge crossings — destruction by Iskander-M would isolate Baltic states from NATO ground reinforcement for 72-96 hours minimum, Powidz Air Base (52.4°N, 17.9°E), Poland — primary BLUFOR Class-E (JDAM, ATACMS) forward ammunition depot; within Iskander-M range from Kaliningrad, Bandar Abbas naval base (27.2°N, 56.3°E) — IRGC primary surface and submarine operating base; under continuous BLUFOR ISR and strike threat, Kharg Island oil loading terminal (29.2°N, 50.3°E) — economic node whose degradation raises coalition political sustainability strain index

7. CYBER / EW ASSESSMENT

Cyber Threat Level: HIGH | **NCI Trajectory:** BLUFOR NCI opens at 3/5 (degraded) due to multi-coalition integration gaps and pre-conflict GRU intrusions into EUCOM logistics networks; assessed to worsen to 4/5 within 48-72 hours of

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OPFOR NCI opens at 2/5 (functional) but is expected to degrade toward 3/5 by Phase 2 as BLUFOR SEAD/DEAD and NSA cyber operations strike Kaliningrad radar and C2 infrastructure — this degradation is the primary mechanism enabling BLUFOR's 35.3% operational victory branch. | **Counter-Battery Risk:** Russian 1st Guards Tank Army and Western MD artillery groupings operating BM-30 Smerch and 2S7M Malka on Ukraine front face HIGH counter-battery risk from BLUFOR AN/TPQ-53 Firefinder radars and HIMARS-delivered GMLRS; units displacing less than every 2-3 minutes after firing are assessed at HIGH risk of ATACMS interdiction. Kaliningrad Iskander-M TELs face lower but non-negligible risk if BLUFOR achieves sufficient ISR persistence over the exclave — assessed at MEDIUM risk given S-400 coverage constraints on NATO ISR platforms.

Key EW Corridors: Kaliningrad EW complex (54.7°N, 20.5°E): Krasukha-4 and R-330Zh Zhitel jamming systems cover a radius of 300 km, targeting NATO Link-16 and JSTARS-class ISR datalinks across the Baltic approaches and Suwalki corridor, Iranian cyber and EW axis along Hormuz coastal belt (26.5°N, 57.0°E): GPS spoofing and marine AIS manipulation targeting coalition naval navigation; IRGC cyber units (APT33/35 nexus) conducting DDoS and SCADA intrusion against Gulf partner-nation port infrastructure

8. KEY DECISION POINTS

Day	Decision Event & Options	Impact	Rationale
D+2	NATO invocation of Article 5 and authorization of kinetic strikes against Kaliningrad A2/AD nodes A: Authorize SEAD/DEAD strikes on Kaliningrad S-400 and Iskander-M sites to open the Baltic air corridor — enables reinforcement but constitutes strikes on Russian sovereign territory and risks nuclear signalling response (consistent with RED-3 Maximum Fait Accompli driving BLUFOR victory to 3.3%) B: Defer strikes on Kaliningrad; rely on standoff fires and Baltic Sea naval maneuver to suppress A2/AD at range — preserves escalation space but leaves the Suwalki Gap under fire and the Baltic theater LOC interdicted, sustaining the bottleneck TSS of 47.5	CRITICAL NATO Secretary General / SACEUR / National capitals (consensus required)	This is the single decision that determines whether the Baltic theater can be rescued from its structural disadvantage; every iteration in which BLUFOR achieves operational victory in that theater requires this decision to go to Option A within the first 48 hours, before Russian forces can consolidate the Gap.
D+4	Russian non-strategic nuclear weapon (NSNW) demonstration or explicit nuclear signalling A: Maintain operational tempo and treat signalling as coercive bluff per reflexive-control doctrine assessment — keeps the 35.3% BLUFOR victory pathway open but accepts a small probability of catastrophic miscalculation feeding the 14.8% Major Escalation bucket B: Pause offensive operations and enter diplomatic off-ramp — reduces escalation risk but cedes initiative and entrenches Contested Stalemate as the dominant outcome, likely above the baseline 49.2%	CRITICAL POTUS / NSC	Russian escalate-to-de-escalate doctrine is designed precisely to force this pause; the sensitivity analysis shows escalation-control breakdown is the second-largest swing factor (-7.6 pp), meaning the credibility of the U.S. response posture at this decision point materially determines the final outcome distribution.

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D+14	Gulf theater — Iranian mine-laying and Strait of Hormuz closure attempt A: Commit additional USN MCM assets and escort forces to keep Hormuz transit open — preserves global energy markets and TSS 63.3 advantage in the Gulf theater but draws naval resources from Baltic reinforcement surge B: Accept temporary Hormuz disruption and prioritize Baltic-European theater mass — concentrates combat power where the campaign is failing (TSS 47.5) but accepts economic pain and Gulf partner-nation political strain	HIGH CENTCOM CDR / POTUS	The Gulf theater is the campaign's timeline governor (59-day median); decisions made here do not resolve faster but they do determine whether the Gulf theater's eventual decisive outcome (73.8% BLUFOR victory) materializes before coalition political sustainability erodes — mean political strain index 17.1/100 is currently manageable but rises with duration.
D+7	Ukraine theater — decision to transfer theater reserves to Baltic axis A: Strip Ukraine theater of one heavy brigade equivalent and reinforce the Suwalki corridor — improves Baltic TSS from 47.5 but risks the Ukraine front (TSS 54.1, BLUFOR victory 23.4%) slipping into attritional OPFOR advantage on the Pokrovsk axis B: Hold Ukraine theater mass in place and accept Baltic theater attrition — preserves the near-parity on the extended Ukraine front but leaves the campaign bottleneck unaddressed for the full 11-14-17 day Baltic timeline	HIGH SACEUR / EUCOM CDR	Non-compensatory theater logic means success in Ukraine cannot offset Baltic failure; this reallocation decision directly tests whether the coalition can execute cross-theater operational maneuver faster than Russian forces can consolidate a fait-accompli in the Gap.
D+10	Coalition political cohesion — key ally threatens withdrawal over escalation concerns A: Offer bilateral security assurances and accelerate burden-sharing negotiations to retain ally — maintains coalition integrity and prevents the +10.3 pp stalemate shift modeled under coalition withdrawal sensitivity B: Accept partial coalition fracture and continue operations with reduced coalition — degrades interoperability and legitimacy, directly actuating the largest single sensitivity factor in the model	HIGH POTUS / State Department / NATO Secretary General	Coalition commitment withdrawal is the highest-magnitude sensitivity in this run (+10.3 pp toward Contested Stalemate); political cohesion management is therefore as operationally decisive as any kinetic action, and the mean strain index of 17.1/100 signals it remains fragile but has not yet become a forcing function.

9. SENSITIVITY FACTORS

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Coalition/allied force commitment withdrawn or delayed	Contested Stalemate probability rises sharply as the Baltic theater — already the campaign bottleneck at TSS 47.5 — loses its primary reinforcement corridor through the Suwalki Gap, collapsing BLUFOR victory prospects there from 2.8% to near-zero and shifting campaign balance decisively toward Russian consolidation	Shifts primary outcome probability +10.3 percentage points (computed: 49.6% -> 59.8% across 20,000 re-run iterations)
OPFOR logistics interdiction fully succeeds	Negligible shift in primary outcome probability — the Baltic and Ukraine theaters are not LOC-constrained at this campaign stage; Russian forward-positioned stockpiles and short interior lines insulate OPFOR from interdiction effects within the 14-22 day operational window	Shifts primary outcome probability -0.1 percentage points (computed: 49.6% -> 49.5% across 20,000 re-run iterations)
Escalation control breaks down (miscalculation risk doubles)	Contested Stalemate probability drops as the Major Escalation bucket absorbs mass from all other outcomes; Iskander-M deployments from Kaliningrad and ambiguous dual-use strikes on NATO infrastructure become the principal driver, with the 14.8% major escalation baseline rising substantially	Shifts primary outcome probability -7.6 percentage points (computed: 49.6% -> 41.9% across 20,000 re-run iterations)
OPFOR achieves a larger initial fait-accompli than modeled	A deeper Russian fait-accompli — particularly seizure of the Suwalki corridor to link Kaliningrad to Belarus — shifts the Contested Stalemate bucket upward sharply, forecloses BLUFOR operational victory in the Baltic, and confronts NATO with the dilemma documented by Crisis Group: restoring the situation requires striking Russian territory, which risks nuclear escalation	Shifts primary outcome probability +11.2 percentage points (computed: 49.6% -> 60.8% across 20,000 re-run iterations)

10. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIR)

Priority	Intelligence Gap	Recommended Collection
PIR	Actual readiness state and forward positioning of Iskander-M brigade in Kaliningrad, including reload stocks and nuclear warhead co-location status	SIGINT (missile battery emission signatures), IMINT (TEL movement and site preparation), HUMINT (GRU/SVR source development within Western Military District)
PIR	Russian intent and timeline for Suwalki Gap ground operation — specifically whether 1st Guards Tank Army elements are pre-positioned forward of Grodno, Belarus for a rapid corridor seizure	IMINT (satellite SAR for all-weather detection of armor concentrations near Grodno), SIGINT (1st GTA command-net activity), OSINT (Belarusian rail manifest analysis)
PIR	Iranian IRGC-Navy mine inventory and pre-positioned minelaying assets in the Strait of Hormuz — critical to Gulf theater timeline and the 47-72 day campaign duration bound	SIGINT, IMINT (dhow and fast-attack craft patterns near Abu Musa Island), HUMINT (port-watcher networks at Bandar Abbas)
PIR	Russian cyber-offensive order of battle targeting NATO C2 nodes and Baltic state power grids — specifically GRU Sandworm unit operational planning against Lithuanian and Polish infrastructure	SIGINT (malware C2 infrastructure tracking), CYBERINT (dark web TTPs), coordinated reporting from CERT-EU and NSA Cybersecurity Directorate
IR	Chinese diplomatic and material support to Russia during the campaign window — particularly dual-use component transfers	SIGINT, HUMINT, financial intelligence (FININT) tracking sanctioned dual-use transactions,

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and potential PLA Navy activity in the North Pacific that could IMINT of Vladivostok port activity constrain U.S. Indo-Pacific redeployment options

11. COLLATERAL DAMAGE & ROE

Theater Friction Index: 3/5 | **Host-Nation Alignment:** HIGH alignment among Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Poland with BLUFOR; MEDIUM alignment in Gulf partner nations contingent on Hormuz remaining open; Ukrainian government fully committed but institutional capacity is degraded after five years of attritional warfare

ROE Constraints: NATO ROE require positive identification and proportionality review before strikes on Kaliningrad, creating a legal-authority lag that slows SEAD/DEAD execution and is the principal structural reason the Baltic theater TSS cannot rise above 47.5 without a National Command Authority decision to authorize strikes on Russian sovereign territory.

Civilian Infra at Risk: Baltic state power grids and telecommunications — Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia all face documented Russian gray-zone targeting of undersea cables and GPS jamming corridors; escalation to kinetic attacks on switching infrastructure is assessed as likely within Phase 1, Ukrainian energy system — Russian forces have conducted over 217 strikes on Ukrainian power infrastructure since January 2026; further strikes in the modeled campaign window will deepen civilian hardship and complicate host-nation logistics support to BLUFOR

12. ENGINE ASSESSMENT (ICD-203) — AI-GENERATED, NOT A HUMAN ANALYST JUDGEMENT

We assess with HIGH confidence — derived from 1,000,000 simulated iterations with a TSS standard deviation of 6 and negative skew of -0.126 — that the most probable campaign outcome is Contested Stalemate (49.2%), driven by structural asymmetries in the Baltic theater that a coalition operational victory in the Gulf (73.8% probability, TSS 63.3) cannot offset. The campaign bottleneck is the Baltic theater, where Russian local A2/AD overmatch from Kaliningrad, a narrow Suwalki reinforcement corridor under Iskander-M threat, and a German-led battlegroup not yet at full readiness converge to produce a TSS of only 47.5 and a BLUFOR victory probability of 2.8%. Strategic outcomes across theaters are non-compensatory: decisive success in the Gulf does not rescue the Baltic, and the campaign duration is governed by the slowest theater (Gulf, median 59 days, range 47-72) rather than by Russian operational tempo. The Loss Exchange Ratio of 0.71 — meaning BLUFOR loses fractionally more combat power per unit of OPFOR attrition — is consistent with Russian front-loaded phase-strength advantage (curve [1.15, 1.0, 0.85]) and confirms that the coalition does not hold a casualty-exchange advantage in this scenario; peak modeled attrition of 42.6% across all iterations did not approach the 55% combat-ineffectiveness threshold, making the breakpoint metric uninformative for this run and requiring separate analyst assessment of magazine exhaustion and deep-attrition effects over a 59-day campaign. The single most dangerous assumption in this analysis is that Russian escalate-to-de-escalate nuclear signalling will be correctly interpreted as coercive rather than operational by NATO decision-makers, and that alliance consensus will hold under that pressure. If this assumption is wrong — if one or more allies treat NSNW signalling as a prelude to use and break coalition consensus — the +10.3 pp coalition-withdrawal sensitivity and the -7.6 pp escalation-breakdown sensitivity compound simultaneously, collapsing the BLUFOR operational victory bucket and driving outcomes toward the 14.8% Major Escalation pathway. The RED-3 Maximum Fait Accompli adversary COA, which drives BLUFOR victory from 35.3% to 3.3%, represents the catastrophic-failure planning baseline and must be treated as such, not as a low-probability footnote. Political sustainability (mean strain index 17.1/100) is currently manageable but is not a calibrated collapse threshold — it is a relative index that will rise nonlinearly if the Gulf theater extends toward its 72-day upper bound while Baltic losses are televised. For the next 72

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decision on Kaliningrad strike authorization before Russian forces can exploit the current A2/AD overmatch to interdict the Suwalki corridor — delay beyond D+2 materially increases the probability of Baltic fait-accompli; second, establish dedicated escalation-management back-channels with Moscow to ensure NSNW signalling is not misread during the Phase 1 high-tempo window, consistent with reflexive-control doctrine recognition; third, preposition MCM assets and additional escort surface combatants for Hormuz contingency no later than D+3 to prevent the Gulf theater from becoming a second simultaneous bottleneck that fractures coalition political cohesion before the Baltic situation is stabilized.

13. ANALYST ASSESSMENT — HUMAN

No human analyst assessment has been entered for this product. The engine assessment in Section 12 is AI-generated and has not been reviewed, endorsed, or supplemented by a human analyst.

14. DOTMLPF-P CAPABILITY DELTA MATRIX

Domains marked COMPUTED are derived from engine state and carry their evidence. Domains marked REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT are outside what an aggregate-force model can measure and are deliberately left empty rather than populated with plausible-sounding text.

Domain	Source	Finding / Evidence
DOCTRINE	COMPUTED	Coordination friction materially degrades effectiveness at this operational complexity. — Complexity multiplier 1.50x baseline friction (simultaneous theaters and/or coalition operation).
ORGANIZATION	COMPUTED	Command and control integrity degraded; fires effectiveness reduced accordingly. — BLUFOR NCI 3/5 vs OPFOR 2/5; NCI is linked to fires effectiveness, not cosmetic.
TRAINING	REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT	The engine does not model individual or collective training readiness. Assess proficiency gaps against the phase structure above.
MATERIEL	COMPUTED	Sustainment degradation over the campaign is a limiting factor. — BLUFOR logistics health 75% initial, fragility multiplier 1.25. NOTE: the engine models aggregate sustainment only — per-munition magazine depletion is NOT computed and must be assessed separately.
LEADERSHIP & EDUCATION	REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT	Not modelled. Assess command decision latency and delegation authority against the decision points in the narrative.
PERSONNEL	REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT	No DSCA diversion was modelled in this run. Assess personnel availability and civil-support obligations if applicable.
FACILITIES	COMPUTED	Force closure is constrained by lift throughput and lines of communication are exposed. — TPFDD Phase 1 closure 75% (intra-theater reinforcement across an alliance land mass); BLUFOR corridor interdiction risk 55%.
POLICY	REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT	No activation delay was modelled. Assess statutory authorities, ROE constraints and release timelines.

4 domain(s) derived from engine state; 4 require analyst input and are deliberately left unpopulated rather than filled with plausible-sounding text.

15. JELC REPRODUCIBILITY TRACE

Field	Value
Engine version	real-montecarlo-v5-wase-integrated
Doctrine set	2026.08-1
Master seed	2376077111

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CRN seed	328693390
Iterations executed	1,000,000
Reproducibility	Re-run with master_seed 2376077111 and identical parameters to reproduce every figure bit-for-bit.
Variance control	Common Random Numbers on all sensitivity and Red-COA comparisons; paired-run difference exactly 0.00pp.
Convergence	Gelman-Rubin R-hat = 1 across 4 independently seeded chains (Strong convergence).
Multi-theater method	Non-compensatory bottleneck: global TSS = MIN(theaters) = 47.5, limiting theater BALTIC. Mean across theaters (55) is reported for comparison only and must not be presented as the campaign outcome.
Red cell	Adversary optimal COA RED-3 (Maximum Fait Accompli) drives BLUFOR victory probability to 3.3%, selected by argmin over independently computed batches.

Verification status: Reproducibility, variance control and convergence are VERIFIED by construction and independently checkable using the procedure in the methodology document. Accreditation status is NOT asserted by this system and must be determined by the reviewing authority.