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EEC-SENTINAL 247 — WARGAME SIMULATION REPORT

Scenario: OPERATION IRON MERIDIAN: US-Led Coalition Multi-Theater Campaign Against China-Russia-DPRK-Iran Adversary Bloc Theater: Multi-Theater: Indo-Pacific (Taiwan Strait / Western Pacific), Eastern Europe (Ukraine Front), Northeast Asia (Korean Peninsula), Middle East (Iran / Strait of Hormuz) Tier: STRATEGIC Iterations: 1,000,000 Generated: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 02:57:59 GMT

1. PRIMARY OUTCOME

BLUFOR/Coalition Operational Victory	Probability: 66% — Timeline: 44-71 days (median 57) — Confidence: HIGH — TSS: 60.8 Victory Condition: Coalition achieves operational-level objectives across three of four theaters within the 40-day campaign window bounded by the Taiwan theater; the PLA fails to consolidate strategic advantage before BLUFOR precision-strike and ISR overmatch degrade OPFOR system-of-systems coherence. Strategic outcome is non-compensatory: the Taiwan theater (TSS 51.3, BLUFOR victory 6.4%) remains the campaign's limiting constraint and is NOT resolved within this window — coalition victory is partial and theater-bounded, not campaign-decisive.
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2. OUTCOME PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION

Outcome	Prob	Dist	Rationale & Key Dependency
BLUFOR/Coalition Operational Victory — Coalition secures operational objectives in Ukraine, Korea, and Middle East theaters; PLA constrained but not defeated in Taiwan theater; adversary bloc fails to consolidate strategic gains within campaign window	66%		Coalition ISR overmatch, precision-strike depth, and JAADO (Joint All-Domain Operations) execution degrade OPFOR system-of-systems coherence in three of four theaters. The Taiwan theater remains the binding constraint — TSS 51.3 and a 6.4% BLUFOR victory probability there reflect the PLA's dense A2/AD envelope, home-territory logistics advantage, and DF-21D/DF-26/YJ-21 anti-ship ballistic missile saturation forcing US CSGs to operate beyond effective strike range. The negative TSS skewness (-0.607) warns that a long tail of worse-than-mean outcomes is concealed by the headline figure. The optimal adversary case — RED-3 Maximum Fait Accompli — collapses BLUFOR victory from 65.9% to 22.9% and must be treated as the planning baseline, not a residual risk. Depends on: Sustained allied force commitment across all four theaters simultaneously; coalition fracture or delayed Japanese/Australian/ROK force integration in the Pacific is the single most dangerous single-variable threat to this outcome
Contested Stalemate — No theater reaches decisive resolution within the modeled 40-day window; frontlines stabilize into attritional holding patterns; political sustainability	27%		Stalemate is most likely to emerge from the Taiwan theater's structural resistance to BLUFOR penetration combined with the Ukraine front's attritional near-parity (TSS 58.9, 52.3% BLUFOR victory probability), where neither side can generate the operational mass for a decisive breakthrough. Political sustainability — distinct from military feasibility —

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degrades coalition cohesion
faster than OPFOR operational
capacity

pressure and coalition consensus friction mount; the strain index of 43.5 does not represent a collapse threshold but signals meaningful degradation of the coalition's ability to absorb further costs.

Depends on: Coalition political sustainability holding above critical fracture threshold through day 40; early ceasefire pressure from non-US partners would collapse this outcome into OPFOR consolidation

Major Escalation Beyond
Modeled Scope — A
miscalculation event —
unauthorized launch, theater
spillover, or dual-use system
misidentification — crosses a
threshold that triggers
escalation dynamics outside
the conventional campaign
envelope, including possible
nuclear signaling

7%




Escalation propensity is modeled at x1.4 above baseline, reflecting the simultaneous activation of four adversary-linked theaters and the historical record of crisis escalation risk compounding non-linearly under multi-front stress. PLA Systems Destruction Warfare doctrine creates specific risk: preemptive strikes on US C4ISR and satellite nodes could be misread as preparation for a nuclear first-strike, and DPRK's independent escalation calculus is not captured in the single-aggregate OPFOR model. A doubling of miscalculation risk shifts primary victory probability -4.8 percentage points, confirming this as a real but bounded threat.

Depends on: Functioning strategic communication channels and nuclear signaling deconfliction between US-China and US-Russia leadership throughout all campaign phases

OPFOR Strategic Advantage /
Consolidation — Adversary
bloc achieves durable strategic
gains; PLA secures Taiwan
Strait control or fait accompli;
coalition unable to reverse
OPFOR territorial or political
consolidation

0%



Near-zero probability under baseline assumptions reflects the coalition's aggregate ISR, precision-strike, and economic-leverage overmatch across three theaters; even under the Taiwan constraint, the PLA cannot translate local A2/AD dominance into multi-theater strategic consolidation without triggering full JAADO coalition response. However, this outcome climbs sharply — from 0.1% baseline toward scenario-terminal risk — under RED-3 Maximum Fait Accompli, where a faster, larger initial Chinese fait accompli in the Taiwan Strait reduces BLUFOR primary victory to 22.9% and opens space for OPFOR consolidation before coalition forces can mass.

Depends on: Speed and scale of any Chinese fait accompli action in the Taiwan Strait in the first 72 hours of the campaign; the -10.9 percentage-point sensitivity to a larger initial fait accompli is the largest single-variable risk in the entire simulation

3. FORCE ASSESSMENT

BLUFOR: US Pacific Command (USPACOM) / Allied Coalition — George Washington CSG (CVN-73, CVW-5, Yokosuka-based), USS Carl Vinson CSG (CVN-70), 7th Fleet submarine force (SSN-688i/Virginia-class),

OPFOR: People's Liberation Army (PLA) — Southern Theater Command (南部战区) PLAN South Sea Fleet / Eastern Theater Command (东部战区) PLAN East Sea Fleet; PLARF DF-21D/DF-26 brigades; PLAAF J-20/J-16

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Command (CFC), Australian ADF elements**Readiness:** 80% | **NCI:** 2/5 | **Sig:** MEDIUM

Logistics: Class-M at 75%, Class-E at 68%; primary supply corridors through Yokosuka and Guam rated AMBER given 55% interdiction risk from PLA long-range strike; pre-positioned stocks at Andersen AFB and Camp Humphreys partially offset depot vulnerabilities

+ Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) — F/A-18E/F and F-35C carrier strike, B-2/B-52 bomber rotations from Andersen AFB, Guam enabling deep-strike against A2/AD nodes | + Virginia-class SSN torpedo and TLAM strike package capable of operating inside PLA A2/AD envelope; AN/BQQ-10 sonar overmatch vs. PLAN conventionals | + Integrated Aegis BMD/THAAD layered missile defense covering Japan and Korean Peninsula approaches; IAMD coordination via Link-16/CEC | + ISR overmatch via P-8A Poseidon, RQ-4 Global Hawk, and space-based systems enabling maritime domain awareness across First and Second Island Chains

! Resupply corridor interdiction risk at 55% — PLA DF-21D/DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles and YJ-18 cruise missiles threaten CSG operating areas west of Guam, compressing carrier maneuvering room | ! Multi-theater demand signal (CENTCOM, Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait simultaneously) fragments strategic lift and degrades magazine depth; Class-E SM-6/ESSM stocks at risk of rapid depletion in high-tempo AAW environment

Logistics: Class-M at 80%, Class-E at 78%; interior lines through Sanya (Yulin Naval Base), Zhoushan, and Qingdao provide robust short-haul sustainment; PLAN logistic replenishment ships (Type 901 Hulunhu-class) extend endurance but remain vulnerable to SSN interdiction beyond the First Island Chain

+ Systems Destruction Warfare (体系破击战) — DF-21D (range ~1,500 km) and DF-26 (range ~4,000 km) anti-ship ballistic missiles threaten CSG maneuvering space; designed to strike C4ISR and logistics nodes before engaging platforms | + PLAN surface combatant mass: 8+ Type 055 Renhai cruisers (112 VLS each), 25-30 Type 052D destroyers; Fujian (CV-18) CATOBAR carrier with J-35 embarked, providing organic fixed-wing strike beyond First Island Chain | + Undersea campaign: 62 submarines including Type 093B/094A nuclear and Type 039C AIP conventional; conventional submarines optimized for shallow-water ambush in South and East China Sea littorals | + Integrated Air Defense System (IADS): HQ-9B/HQ-22 SAM networks covering Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, networked with KJ-500 AEW and ground-based OTH radar — effective A2/AD envelope exceeding 1,000 km from coastline

! Front-loaded force curve per applied phase-strength model (peak Phase 1, decay Phase 3): PLA operational tempo is designed for short decisive campaigns; a prolonged 44-71 day engagement degrades PLAN magazine depth and exposes Type 901 replenishment ships to SSN interdiction | ! C4ISR node concentration: Southern and Eastern Theater Command joint operations centers at Sanya and Nanjing present high-value cyber and kinetic strike targets; NCI degradation accelerates as BLUFOR SEAD/DEAD and cyber operations attrit network nodes

4. TERRAIN & THEATER ANALYSIS**Dominant Terrain**

Multi-theater maritime and littoral: Taiwan Strait (180 km wide, 60-100 m depth, constrained maneuvering corridor); South China Sea (semi-enclosed, PLA-fortified island features at Fiery Cross Reef 9.55°N 114.08°E, Mischief Reef 9.92°N 115.53°E, Subi Reef 10.92°N 114.08°E providing runway, radar, and SAM coverage); Yellow Sea shallow littoral (avg 44 m depth, constrains nuclear submarine operations and favors PLA AIP conventionals); Korean Peninsula's Taebaek mountain spine channeling ground force axes of advance

Movement Friction

Maritime theater friction rated 3/5: PLA island basing in the South China Sea and A2/AD SAM coverage compresses BLUFOR surface transit corridors to pre-planned deconflicted lanes, while typhoon-season sea states (June-October) and mine-threat uncertainty in the Taiwan Strait and Bohai Gulf impose 20-35% planning margins on amphibious and logistics movement.

Weather Modifier

Western Pacific typhoon season (peak August-October) imposes intermittent HIGH-sea-state periods degrading aviation sortie rates by an estimated 15-30% and limiting underway replenishment windows to Force 4 or below; PLA shore-based systems are less exposed to weather friction than BLUFOR carrier aviation.

Infrastructure Risk

Guam (Anderson AFB 13 58°N 144 93°E Anra Harbor 13 44°N 144 65°E) is the

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suppression of Guam would degrade Class-E sustainment by an estimated 40% and extend BLUFOR response timelines across all three sub-theaters.

5. MOST PROBABLE COURSE OF ACTION: OPERATION IRON MERIDIAN — COALITION MARITIME BLOCKADE OF CHINA, MULTI-THEATER SIMULTANEOUS PRESSURE

The coalition initiates a coordinated maritime and air blockade of China's principal sea lanes of communication, concentrating interdiction pressure at the Malacca, Luzon, and Taiwan straits while simultaneously sustaining defensive postures in the Korean and Ukrainian theaters. BLUFOR leverages joint all-domain operations, ISR overmatch, and submarine-heavy interdiction to degrade PRC import throughput, accepting that the Taiwan theater constitutes the campaign's strategic bottleneck at TSS 51.3.

WHAT HAPPENS, IN ORDER

At D+0, coalition submarines — including USS Connecticut (SSN-22) and HMAS Rankin (SSK) — establish patrol barriers at the Malacca Strait (1.25°N, 103.82°E) and Luzon Strait (20.5°N, 121.8°E), while BLUFOR cyber teams execute the initial network intrusion package against PLA Southern Theater Command C2 nodes at Zhanjiang; PLA Southern Theater Command responds within hours by surging PLAN Type 052D destroyers and H-6K bombers — units confirmed operating near Scarborough Shoal as recently as August 2026 — into a forward screening posture, activating the DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile regiments along the Fujian and Guangdong coasts, and deploying SIGINT vessel AGI-797 to harvest coalition emission signatures, demonstrating the front-loaded peak the phase-strength curve (1.0 → 1.1 → 1.05) predicts for the OPFOR. By D+10, the blockade's economic bite begins to show in reduced tanker transits through the Strait of Malacca, but BLUFOR's 55% resupply-corridor interdiction risk — against OPFOR's 30% — forces a logistics adjustment: coalition surface groups pull back from DF-21D engagement envelopes (beyond ~1,500 km) and shift strike execution to submarines and long-range standoff munitions including AGM-158C LRASM and Tomahawk Block V, compressing the tempo of the air interdiction effort and extending the campaign toward its computed D+32–49 envelope. The Taiwan sub-theater, where the PLAN operates from home territory inside an intact A2/AD architecture anchored by the Fujian-based carrier strike group (CV-18 Fujian, CATOBAR-equipped with electromagnetic catapults) and shore-based HQ-9 and HQ-22 SAM belts, proves the binding constraint: BLUFOR cannot establish meaningful sea control inside the First Island Chain without accepting disproportionate attrition, holding the theater TSS to 51.3 and the campaign bottleneck firmly at D+40 (range 32–49 days). The PLA's own culmination arrives near D+25–30 as the phase-strength curve decays from its Phase 2 peak — sustained DF ballistic missile employment draws down refire stocks, dispersed PLAN surface units begin experiencing Class-M maintenance shortfalls, and BLUFOR's persistent ISR (P-8A Poseidon, MQ-4C Triton, allied E-7A Wedgetail) enables progressive suppression of OPFOR emission sources — after which coalition forces gradually widen the blockade arc and tighten enforcement, producing the 65.8% BLUFOR victory probability as economic and political pressure compounds military attrition through campaign closure near D+57 median.

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D+0 → D+14 — **BLUFOR** dominates | Concept: BLUFOR: Undersea Campaign / Maritime Interdiction Operations / SEAD suppression of IADS. OPFOR: Systems Destruction Warfare — targeting BLUFOR C4ISR nodes and logistics corridors ahead of platforms.

Coalition submarines and maritime patrol aircraft establish blockade barriers at the Malacca and Luzon straits; BLUFOR cyber teams execute initial intrusion against PLA Southern Theater Command C2 nodes at Zhanjiang and Yulin Naval Base. OPFOR activates its A2/AD envelope in force, surging Type 052D/055 surface action groups and DF-21D/DF-26 ASBM regiments to forward firing positions, front-loading its combat power consistent with the phase-strength factor of 1.0→1.1.

Logistics: Class-M MEDIUM, Class-E HIGH (initial salvo expenditure) Attrition: BLUFOR 4–7%, OPFOR 6–10%

- D+0H2 Submarine Barrier Activation — Malacca Strait [naval_op] (MK-48 ADCAP torpedo (standby), acoustic barrier) — USS Connecticut (SSN-22) and HMAS Rankin establish covert patrol barrier; first PLAN-flagged tanker challenged and turned back, signaling blockade enforcement intent.
 - D+0H4 BLUFOR Cyber Strike — Zhanjiang C2 Node [cyber] (CNO intrusion package) — PLA Southern Theater Command data-link relay degraded; coordination latency between Zhanjiang HQ and forward PLAN surface groups increases by estimated 40–60 minutes.
 - D+3H6 PLAN SAG Forward Surge — Scarborough Shoal [naval_op] (YJ-18 ASCM, HHQ-9 SAM (Type 055 Renhai loadout)) — PLAN Type 055 CG Nanchang and two Type 052D DDGs establish forward screening posture at Scarborough Shoal, extending A2/AD umbrella ~450 nm west of Luzon Strait and threatening coalition maritime patrol orbit.
 - D+7H12 LRASM Stand-off Strike — PLAN Yulin Submarine Pen Approaches [strike] (AGM-158C LRASM (B-1B Lancer delivery, Andersen AFB)) — Four LRASMs strike pier-side logistics infrastructure at Yulin; one Type 039A submarine delayed sortie by 72 hours, reducing PLAN undersea screen density during critical barrier-establishment window.
 - D+11H18 DF-26 Salvo — Guam Logistics Complex (Non-Nuclear) [strike] (DF-26B conventional anti-ship/land-attack variant) — Three DF-26B rounds impact Apra Harbor fuel pier and Naval Magazine access road; THAAD Battery-A intercepts two, one round causes moderate damage to fuel offloading infrastructure, elevating BLUFOR Class-M corridor risk.
- **USS George Washington CSG-5 (CVN-73)** [Fleet] (US 7th Fleet) OR:82%
- **PLAN South Sea Fleet Submarine Force (Type 039A/093B)** [Fleet] (PLAN Southern Theater Command) OR:78%
- **JMSDF Escort Flotilla 2 (JS Atago DDG-177 + 3x Murasame-class)** [Fleet] (Japan JMSDF) OR:85%

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D+15 → D+35 — **CONTESTED** dominates | Concept: OPFOR: Joint Firepower Strike — sustained DF-21D/DF-26 targeting of BLUFOR surface groups; PLAN carrier Fujian operating inside First Island Chain for air supremacy. BLUFOR: Joint All-Domain Operations — distributed maritime operations, ISR-enabled precision strike, EA-18G Growler EW suppression of PLAN HQ-9/HQ-22 IADS.

The blockade enters contested enforcement: BLUFOR surface and air assets enforce interdiction at standoff range while OPFOR sustains its A2/AD peak (phase-strength factor 1.1), conducting sustained ASBM targeting, electronic warfare jamming, and maritime militia harassment of coalition enforcement vessels. BLUFOR's ISR constellation — P-8A Poseidon, MQ-4C Triton, E-7A Wedgetail — enables progressive attrition of PLAN emissions sources while coalition logistics rerouting through Australia's HMAS Stirling and Japanese MSDF Sasebo mitigates the elevated 55% corridor interdiction risk.

Logistics: Class-M HIGH, Class-E HIGH (sustained ASBM and LRASM expenditure) Attrition: BLUFOR 9–14%, OPFOR 12–18%

- D+18H8 DF-21D Salvo — USS Theodore Roosevelt CSG (near-miss deterrence shot) [strike] (DF-21D (ASBM, maneuvering reentry vehicle)) — Two DF-21D rounds, cued by PLAN AGI SIGINT data, impact within 12 nm of USS Theodore Roosevelt; SM-3 Block IIA intercepts one, forcing CSG to maneuver beyond 1,500-km engagement envelope and temporarily suspending F/A-18E strike sorties over northern Luzon.

- D+22H14 Tomahawk Block V Salvo — PLAN DF-21D TEL Dispersal Sites, Fujian Coast [strike] (BGM-109H Tomahawk Block V (JASSM-ER supplementary)) — Coalition submarine salvo targets six confirmed DF-21D TEL dispersal sites near Putian; two TELs destroyed, four displaced, temporarily reducing ASBM sortie rate by ~35% for 96 hours.

- D+28H6 EA-18G Growler EW Suppression — PLAN HQ-9 Battery, Woody Island [air] (ALQ-99 / NGJ-MB jamming pod, AGM-88E AARGM) — VMAQ Growler package suppresses Woody Island HQ-9 SAM radar for 4-hour window, enabling MQ-4C Triton ISR passes over PLAN surface group anchorage at Fiery Cross Reef.

- D+33H20 PLAN Carrier Fujian Air Wing Strike — Luzon Strait Enforcement Zone [air] (J-35A (carrier-borne), YJ-12 ASCM) — CV-18 Fujian launches 24-aircraft J-35A strike against coalition enforcement patrol; BLUFOR F-35C/SM-6 intercept attrites 14 inbound, but YJ-12 salvo damages HMAS Brisbane (DDG-41), forcing withdrawal to Subic Bay for emergency repair.

→ **CV-18 Fujian CVBG (PLAN Eastern Theater Command)** [Fleet] (PLAN Eastern Theater Command) OR:80%

→ **31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (USS America LHA-6)** [Brigade] (US 7th Fleet / III MEF) OR:83%

→ **RAAF No. 75 Squadron F-35A (RAAF Base Tindal)** [Squadron] (Australia RAAF) OR:87%

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D+36 → D+57 — **BLUFOR** dominates | Concept: BLUFOR: Operational Fires — sustained standoff precision strike against PLAN logistics nodes and ASW barriers; coalition diplomatic consolidation via QUAD+. OPFOR: Active Defense reversion — operationally offensive posture exhausted, strategic-defensive posture reasserted as PLARF refire capacity degraded.

OPFOR phase-strength decays to 1.05 factor as sustained DF ballistic missile employment draws down refire stocks, PLAN Class-M maintenance shortfalls emerge across dispersed surface units, and accumulated C2 degradation limits coordinated Joint Firepower Strike execution. BLUFOR progressively widens the blockade arc, achieves partial economic strangulation of PRC seaborne energy imports, and applies political-diplomatic pressure alongside military culmination — producing the 65.8% BLUFOR victory probability through compound economic and military attrition rather than a single decisive engagement, consistent with the mean peak attrition of 22.6% across all iterations remaining well below a force-breaking threshold.

Logistics: Class-M MEDIUM (sustainment phase), Class-E MEDIUM (reduced salvo rates) Attrition: BLUFOR 5–9% (cumulative Phase 3 incremental), OPFOR 8–12% (cumulative Phase 3 incremental)

- D+38H10 PLAN ASBM Sortie Rate Collapse — PLARF Refire Depletion [strike] (DF-21D (reduced salvo, estimated <50% original refire capacity)) — PLARF DF-21D regiment assessed at less than 50% refire capacity; BLUFOR CSGs advance 200 nm westward into former exclusion zone, restoring F/A-18 E strike range over northern Luzon Strait approaches.
 - D+44H16 Coalition Blockade Arc Extension — Taiwan Strait Southern Mouth [naval_op] (Harpoon Block II+ (surface launch), MK-54 torpedo) — JMSDF and USN surface enforcement group closes southern Taiwan Strait mouth to PLAN resupply traffic; three PLAN maritime militia vessels turned back, one CCG cutter disabled, marking effective close of the blockade perimeter.
 - D+52 PRC Economic Pressure Threshold — Seaborne Energy Import Reduction [logistics] (N/A) — Open-source shipping data indicates PRC seaborne crude oil imports reduced by an estimated 38% from pre-conflict baseline; internal PRC strategic reserve drawdown accelerates, compounding political sustainability pressure indexed at mean strain 43.5/100.
- **USS Theodore Roosevelt CSG (CVN-71)** [Fleet] (US 7th Fleet) OR:76%
- **PLAN South Sea Fleet SAG (Type 052D residual element)** [Fleet] (PLAN Southern Theater Command) OR:61%
- **Indian Navy Eastern Fleet (INS Vikrant CVL + 2x Kolkata-class DDG)** [Fleet] (India Eastern Naval Command) OR:80%

6. LOGISTICS ASSESSMENT

Class-M Days	Class-E Days	Interdiction Risk
38	29	HIGH

BLUFOR Corridor: Primary BLUFOR corridor: CONUS West Coast → Pearl Harbor (21.35°N -157.97°E) → Guam (Apra Harbor) → Yokosuka (35.29°N 139.67°E) / Sasebo (33.15°N 129.72°E) → forward operating areas; corridor assessed at 55% interdiction risk from PLARF and PLAN submarine threat, creating a strategic vulnerability that the sensitivity analysis confirms is the single largest swing variable — coalition force commitment and PLA fait accompli depth both lever off this corridor's survivability

OPFOR Corridor: PLAN interior-line sustainment: Yulin Naval Base Sanya (18.22°N 109.51°E) and Zhoushan (30.00°N 122.11°E) provide short-haul Class-M/E replenishment on interior lines; Type 901 Hulunhu-class replenishment ships extend reach to South China Sea island features; assessed at 30% interdiction risk, conferring a meaningful logistics advantage in early phases that degrades only if BLUFOR SSNs successfully operate inside the First Island Chain

Δ At Risk: Andersen AFB, Guam (13.58°N 144.93°E) — PLARF DF-26 conventional strike threat; suppression would cut B-2/B-52 sortie rates and sever the primary BLUFOR Class-E resupply node for the Taiwan sub-theater, Yokosuka Naval Base (35.29°N 139.67°E) — Forward CSG home port; DF-21C/DF-26 conventional strike and submarine-launched YJ-18 threat; loss would force CSG operations from Guam, adding 2,800 km to response geometry

7. CYBER / EW ASSESSMENT

Cyber Threat Level: HIGH | **NCI Trajectory:** Both sides open at NCI 2 (moderate C2 integrity); PLA Systems Destruction Warfare doctrine prioritizes cyber strikes on BLUFOR JTIDS/CEC nodes and Yokosuka/Guam comms

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and cyber operations at the Eastern Theater Command C2 nodes at Nanjing and Sanya from D+15 onward | **Counter-**

Battery Risk: PLARF mobile DF-21D/DF-26 TELs operating from dispersed inland garrisons (Qingyuan, Leping) present a persistent counter-battery challenge; TEL displacement cycles estimated at 30-45 minutes, requiring near-real-time SIGINT cueing from RC-135V/W or E-8C to achieve kill-chain closure before displacement — firing units that fail to displace within one displacement cycle are at HIGH risk from JASSM-ER or TLAM Block V follow-on strikes

Key EW Corridors: Taiwan Strait EW corridor (23°N-26°N, 119°E-123°E): PLA ground-based EW systems at Fujian coast and Penghu garrison generate jamming envelope targeting BLUFOR Link-16, GPS, and JTIDS; J-16D dedicated EW aircraft (Shandong-based) extends suppression to 600 km, South China Sea island-feature EW belt (9°N-16°N, 112°E-117°E): Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi Reef installations field Type 958 jamming and YLC-8B passive radar, creating a persistent BLUFOR emissions-exploitation environment throughout the South China Sea operating area

8. KEY DECISION POINTS

Day	Decision Event & Options	Impact	Rationale
D+1	POTUS decision on Article 5 / mutual defense trigger and coalition force release authority across simultaneous INDOPACOM and EUCOM theaters A: Authorize full joint force release including pre-positioned INDOPACOM assets and forward-deployed carrier strike groups; triggers allied operational commitments under bilateral defense treaties with Japan and ROK B: Phase commitment — hold INDOPACOM surge forces pending assessment of EUCOM demand, prioritizing Ukraine theater; risks ceding initiative in Taiwan and Korea sub-theaters during the window when PLA force is at its doctrinal peak (Phase 1 strength multiplier 1.0)	CRITICAL POTUS / NSC	Multi-theater simultaneity is the defining constraint of this campaign; delay in cross-theater force release is the mechanism behind the coalition-withdrawal sensitivity (-9.3 pp) and is the earliest irreversible decision in the campaign sequence.
D+5	INDOPACOM Commander decision on Taiwan Strait maritime exclusion zone declaration and Freedom of Navigation escort posture A: Declare a coordinated maritime exclusion zone with Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and commit CSG-11 (USS Ronald Reagan) to active escort operations through the First Island Chain, forcing PLA PLAN surface action groups to commit or withdraw B: Delay overt declaration; sustain ISR pressure via P-8A Poseidon and E-7A Wedgetail orbits while PLA exhausts Phase 1 surge momentum, accepting temporary loss of maritime freedom of maneuver	CRITICAL INDOPACOM CDR / SECDEF	This decision governs whether the Taiwan sub-theater (TSS 51.3, the campaign bottleneck) stabilizes or deteriorates; a delayed declaration allows PLA Systems Destruction Warfare targeting of BLUFOR C4ISR nodes before BLUFOR establishes sea control.
D+3	Korea theater: USFK and ROK JCS decision on pre-emptive counter-battery fire against DPRK KN-25 and KN-23 rocket artillery missed north of the DMZ	HIGH USFK CDR / ROK CJCS	Korea is the highest-TSS sub-theater (63.5) but also the fastest to culminate (11-18 days); failing to suppress DPRK rocket artillery in the opening 72 hours risks catastrophic ROK civilian and

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A: Authorize pre-emptive ATACMS and ROK KTSSM counter-battery strikes against confirmed DPRK artillery and MLRS positions in Kaesong and Haeju areas before DPRK initiates its opening bombardment, accepting risk of triggering broader escalation

B: Hold under ROE; absorb initial DPRK fires and respond with reactive counter-battery via AN/TPQ-53 cueing, trading early attrition for escalation control and coalition political cohesion

military infrastructure losses that cannot be recovered within the campaign window.

D+8 PLA CMC decision on DF-21D / DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile employment against USN carrier strike groups

A: Authorize PLARF Base 61 (Huangshan, Anhui) DF-21D salvo against a CSG transiting within the second island chain — a strategic escalation that validates PLA Systems Destruction Warfare doctrine but risks crossing a red line that triggers expanded US strike authority against mainland targets

B: Withhold ASBM employment; rely on PLAN surface and submarine interdiction plus PLAAF J-20 and H-6K strikes within the first island chain, preserving escalation ladder rungs and avoiding direct strikes on US naval assets

CRITICAL
PLA CMC / Xi Jinping

This is the highest-consequence single adversary decision in the campaign; DF-21D employment against a CSG would drive the Major Escalation outcome (currently 7.1%) sharply upward and is the mechanism most likely to push the campaign into the 'Beyond Modeled Scope' bucket.

D+20 Coalition political sustainability threshold: European NATO member decision on continued force contributions given concurrent Ukraine demands

A: Sustain full NATO partner contributions to BLUFOR coalition across both EUCOM and INDOPACOM theaters; accept domestic political cost and munitions drawdown to maintain campaign coherence

B: Announce a 'pause for diplomacy' — de facto partial withdrawal of enablers (tanker aircraft, ISR, logistics) from the Indo-Pacific theater to prioritize European defense, degrading coalition interoperability at the moment BLUFOR needs to transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3

HIGH
NATO NAC / European allied governments

The political strain index (mean 43.5/100) has not crossed a collapse threshold but is directionally adverse; a NATO fracture event at D+20 would convert a BLUFOR operational victory trajectory into a contested stalemate, consistent with the 27.0% stalemate probability.

9. SENSITIVITY FACTORS

Factor	Impact if Changed	Probability Shift
Coalition/allied force commitment withdrawn or delayed	Withdrawal or delay of allied contributions — particularly Japanese basing access for Taiwan operations and ROK interoperability in Korea — degrades BLUFOR combined-	Shifts primary outcome probability -9.3 percentage points (computed: 65.9% ->

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	arms integration and exposes supply corridors, shifting BLUFOR victory probability from 65.9% to 56.6%	56.6% across 20,000 re-run iterations)
OPFOR logistics interdiction fully succeeds	Full logistics interdiction of OPFOR produces negligible net shift (+0.1 pp) because PLA pre-positioned stocks and dispersed inland supply chains absorb the interdiction pressure within the modeled phase window — BLUFOR victory probability remains effectively unchanged at 66%	Shifts primary outcome probability +0 percentage points (computed: 65.9% -> 66% across 20,000 re-run iterations)
Escalation control breaks down (miscalculation risk doubles)	If miscalculation risk doubles — plausible given simultaneous operations across four adversary nodes with shared ISR and cross-theater signaling per observed China-Iran-Russia coordination patterns — BLUFOR victory probability drops to 61.2% and the Major Escalation bucket expands materially	Shifts primary outcome probability -4.8 percentage points (computed: 65.9% -> 61.2% across 20,000 re-run iterations)
OPFOR achieves a larger initial fait accompli than modeled	A larger PLA or DPRK fait accompli — seizure of outlying Taiwan features, forward Korean terrain, or rapid Hormuz closure in coordination — shifts BLUFOR victory from 65.9% to 55.0%, the single largest modeled sensitivity and the condition under which RED-3 Maximum Fait Accompli drives BLUFOR victory to 22.9%	Shifts primary outcome probability -10.9 percentage points (computed: 65.9% -> 55% across 20,000 re-run iterations)

10. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIR)

Priority	Intelligence Gap	Recommended Collection
PIR	Actual PLA Eastern Theater Command readiness and pre-positioning of amphibious lift — Type 075 LHDs and Type 071 LPDs — ahead of D-Day; current OSINT cannot confirm whether a large-scale exercise posture has transitioned to a no-notice operational deployment	IMINT (commercial SAR satellites over Zhoushan and Zhanjiang naval bases), SIGINT (PLARF and PLAN emission pattern changes), HUMINT
PIR	DPRK KN-25 and Hwasong-11Ka forward deployment status north of the DMZ and operational readiness of WMD-capable delivery systems; current assessment relies on pattern-of-life from 2025 data	IMINT (NRO tasking on Kaesong, Wonsan, and Haeju logistics nodes), SIGINT, ROK NIS HUMINT
PIR	Extent of real-time PLA-Iran intelligence sharing — specifically whether Chinese geospatial intelligence and targeting data is being passed to IRGC missile forces for targeting of US naval assets in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, as OSINT reporting suggests dual-use technology transfer is ongoing	SIGINT, CYBERCOM exploitation, HUMINT (Tehran and Beijing nodes)
IR	Russian Pacific Fleet operational intentions — whether Severodvinsk II-class SSGN and Kilo-class submarines recently added to the Pacific Fleet are being postured for anti-SLOC operations against BLUFOR logistics corridors between CONUS and Guam/Japan	SOSUS/IUSS acoustic collection, P-8A Poseidon SIGINT/MAD patrols, allied SIGINT (Japan, Australia)
IR	BLUFOR coalition political sustainability: current intelligence on allied domestic political conditions in Japan and Australia — specifically whether any government is approaching a threshold at which legislative or public pressure would constrain basing access or force commitments	OSINT (parliamentary reporting, polling data), State Department HUMINT, embassy reporting

11. COLLATERAL DAMAGE & ROE

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positioned US forces, MEDIUM alignment with Australia and Philippines given political sensitivity around basing expansion; LOW alignment with non-treaty partners whose support is contingent on campaign momentum

ROE Constraints: BLUFOR ROE prohibit kinetic strikes on PLA mainland C4ISR nodes without explicit POTUS authorization, structurally limiting the depth of BLUFOR's Systems Destruction Warfare counter-response and constraining the ability to suppress PLARF Base 61 DF-21D launch sites before they execute a salvo.

Civilian Infra at Risk: Taiwan Strait undersea cable corridors (Segment 3/4 Pacific crossing) — disruption would sever commercial internet for 95% of trans-Pacific traffic, with immediate economic and humanitarian cascades beyond the military campaign, Korean peninsula civilian population centers south of the DMZ — Seoul metropolitan area (pop. ~25M) within DPRK KN-25 rocket artillery range; hardened infrastructure insufficient to absorb a full DPRK opening bombardment without civilian mass-casualty events

12. ENGINE ASSESSMENT (ICD-203) — AI-GENERATED, NOT A HUMAN ANALYST JUDGEMENT

We assess with HIGH confidence that BLUFOR achieves an operational victory in the aggregate campaign (65.9% probability, TSS mean 57.9) but with strong analytical concern that the aggregate masks a campaign-limiting failure in the Taiwan sub-theater, which posts the lowest Theater Success Score (TSS 51.3) and is the binding constraint on campaign duration (40-day range, 32-49 days). The TSS distribution carries a negative skew (-0.607) indicating a long tail of worse-than-mean outcomes that the modal result conceals; commanders should plan to the left tail, not the mean. The RED-3 Maximum Fait Accompli adversary COA is analytically treated as the planning baseline: under that condition, BLUFOR victory probability collapses to 22.9%, and the Taiwan bottleneck becomes a campaign-ending failure, not a recoverable deficit. The Loss Exchange Ratio of 0.79 (favoring OPFOR) is the most consequential single metric in this run: BLUFOR is absorbing fractional losses at a rate 27% higher than it is imposing, meaning the campaign is won on operational depth, allied commitment, and political sustainability — not on per-engagement exchange efficiency. This is a structurally fragile victory condition. The most dangerous assumption in this analysis is that BLUFOR escalation control holds across four simultaneous adversary nodes. The engine models one aggregate OPFOR (PLA doctrine applied), but in reality China, Russia, DPRK, and Iran are demonstrated coordination partners with shared ISR, cross-theater signaling capacity, and a documented pattern of using proxy-theater operations to disperse American military attention away from the Pacific. A coordinated DPRK artillery opening synchronized with a PLA ASBM employment against a CSG — even if neither action alone crosses the nuclear threshold — could simultaneously push the Korea theater into unmodeled casualty regimes and the Taiwan theater into the Major Escalation bucket, invalidating the aggregate BLUFOR victory finding entirely. The political strain index (43.5/100) has directional momentum that this engine cannot model to conclusion; if European NATO partners impose a phase-line on contributions at D+20, the TSS floor drops further, and the stalemate bucket (27.0%) becomes the modal outcome. For the next 72 hours, the commander's immediate priorities are threefold: (1) Secure POTUS authorization for cross-theater force release and confirm allied basing access agreements with Japan and the Philippines before PLA ISR can assess BLUFOR deployment patterns, preserving the initiative advantage that Phase 1 doctrinal sequencing requires; (2) Task NRO and CYBERCOM collection against PLARF Base 61 emission signatures and PLA-Iran intelligence-sharing channels — these are the two highest-priority intelligence gaps whose closure or non-closure will determine whether the DF-21D employment decision point (D+8) can be shaped by BLUFOR or will instead be reactive; (3) Pre-position ATACMS and ROK KTSSM counter-battery assets within validated

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the Korea theater commander can suppress the opening bombardment without waiting for release authority — the Korea TSS of 63.5 is achievable only if DPRK rocket artillery is disrupted before it achieves full effect.

13. ANALYST ASSESSMENT — HUMAN

No human analyst assessment has been entered for this product. The engine assessment in Section 12 is AI-generated and has not been reviewed, endorsed, or supplemented by a human analyst.

14. DOTMLPF-P CAPABILITY DELTA MATRIX

Domains marked *COMPUTED* are derived from engine state and carry their evidence. Domains marked *REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT* are outside what an aggregate-force model can measure and are deliberately left empty rather than populated with plausible-sounding text.

Domain	Source	Finding / Evidence
DOCTRINE	COMPUTED	Coordination friction materially degrades effectiveness at this operational complexity. — Complexity multiplier 1.80x baseline friction (simultaneous theaters and/or coalition operation).
ORGANIZATION	COMPUTED	Command and control integrity within tolerance. — BLUFOR NCI 2/5 vs OPFOR 2/5; NCI is linked to fires effectiveness, not cosmetic.
TRAINING	REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT	The engine does not model individual or collective training readiness. Assess proficiency gaps against the phase structure above.
MATERIEL	COMPUTED	Sustainment degradation over the campaign is a limiting factor. — BLUFOR logistics health 75% initial, fragility multiplier 0.8. NOTE: the engine models aggregate sustainment only — per-munition magazine depletion is NOT computed and must be assessed separately.
LEADERSHIP & EDUCATION	REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT	Not modelled. Assess command decision latency and delegation authority against the decision points in the narrative.
PERSONNEL	REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT	No DSCA diversion was modelled in this run. Assess personnel availability and civil-support obligations if applicable.
FACILITIES	COMPUTED	Force closure is constrained by lift throughput and lines of communication are exposed. — TPFDD Phase 1 closure 55% (trans-oceanic (Indo-Pacific) power projection); BLUFOR corridor interdiction risk 55%.
POLICY	REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT	No activation delay was modelled. Assess statutory authorities, ROE constraints and release timelines.

4 domain(s) derived from engine state; 4 require analyst input and are deliberately left unpopulated rather than filled with plausible-sounding text.

15. JELC REPRODUCIBILITY TRACE

Field	Value
Engine version	real-montecarlo-v5-wase-integrated
Doctrine set	2026.08-1
Master seed	3882807475
CRN seed	2035910922
Iterations executed	1,000,000
Reproducibility	Re-run with master_seed 3882807475 and identical parameters to reproduce every figure bit-for-bit.
Variance control	Common Random Numbers on all sensitivity and Red-COA comparisons; paired-run difference exactly 0.00pp.

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Non-compensatory bottleneck: global ISS = $\text{MIN}(\text{theaters}) = 51.3$, limiting theater TAIWAN. Mean across theaters (57.9) is reported for comparison only and must not be presented as the campaign outcome.

Red cell

Adversary optimal COA RED-3 (Maximum Fait Accompli) drives BLUFOR victory probability to 22.9%, selected by argmin over independently computed batches.

Verification status: Reproducibility, variance control and convergence are VERIFIED by construction and independently checkable using the procedure in the methodology document. Accreditation status is NOT asserted by this system and must be determined by the reviewing authority.