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EEC-SENTINAL 247 — WARGAME SIMULATION REPORT

Scenario: OPERATION IRON MERIDIAN: US-Led Coalition Maritime Blockade of China — South China Sea / Western Pacific
Theater Theater: Indo-Pacific — South China Sea, East China Sea, Western Pacific Tier: STRATEGIC Iterations: 1,000,000
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1. PRIMARY OUTCOME

Contested Stalemate	Probability: 56% — Timeline: 3-4 days (median 4) — Confidence: MEDIUM-HIGH — TSS: 55.5 Victory Condition: Coalition blockade cordon established but not fully enforced; PLAN A2/AD envelope degrades coalition freedom of maneuver; neither side achieves operational objectives within the 3–4 day modeled window. Resolution projected within 3–4 days (median 4), with the contested stalemate condition emerging as PLAN Systems Destruction Warfare disrupts coalition ISR and sustainment links while the coalition maintains enough presence to deny Chinese maritime consolidation.
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2. OUTCOME PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION

Outcome	Prob	Dist	Rationale & Key Dependency
Contested Stalemate — Coalition blockade cordon partially enforced; PLAN A2/AD preserves sea-denial within first island chain; no decisive outcome for either side within 3–4 day window	56%		OPFOR's superior effective readiness (84%), lower interdiction risk (30% vs. 55%), and front-loaded phase-strength curve combine with the coalition's ROE constraints and C2 friction (NCI 3/5 for both sides) to prevent decisive action in either direction. The TSS of 55.5 — near the midpoint — and negative skewness (-0.146) confirm a distribution marginally biased toward degraded outcomes for the coalition rather than clean victory. Depends on: Coalition force cohesion and sustained commitment across all contributing actors (Japan, Australia, India); withdrawal or delay by any major partner is the single highest-leverage variable per sensitivity re-runs.
BLUFOR/Coalition Operational Victory — Blockade cordon achieves sufficient enforcement to compel Chinese operational pause; PLAN surface forces unable to contest outer sea lines; coalition air superiority established over key approach corridors	35%		Achievable only if coalition sustains ISR overmatch, suppresses PLAN A2/AD through SEAD/DEAD of DF-21D/DF-26 launch infrastructure, and maintains allied force commitment throughout; the 35.2% probability reflects scenarios where PLAAF and PLAN reach culmination before coalition sustainment degrades below operational threshold. Depends on: Early establishment of coalition air superiority over the Luzon Strait and Bashi Channel corridors, and maintenance of BLUFOR resupply corridors against 55% interdiction risk.
Major Escalation Beyond Modeled Scope — Kinetic exchange triggers	7%		Escalation propensity multiplier of x1.4 combined with a multi-actor OPFOR (China, Russia, Iran) that


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signaling, strikes on third-party territory, or multi-theater simultaneous activation (Russia, Iran) expands conflict beyond this engine's single-adversary model

simultaneous doctrinal actors elevates tail risk; the RED-2 optimal adversary COA — Asymmetric Interdiction and Escalation Leverage — drives this bucket significantly, collapsing BLUFOR victory probability from 35.2% to 5.3% in optimal-adversary re-runs, making escalation leverage the most dangerous adversary response.

Depends on: Whether PRC leadership perceives the coalition blockade as an existential regime threat triggering unrestricted escalation, and whether Russia or Iran exploit the coalition's divided attention.

OPFOR Strategic Advantage / Consolidation — PLAN achieves sea control within first island chain, coalition forces withdraw beyond effective interdiction range, and China consolidates maritime access corridor

1% 

Extremely low probability (1.4%) because coalition baseline readiness and ISR overmatch, even at degraded 76% effective readiness, prevents full PLAN consolidation within the 3–4 day window; this outcome requires simultaneous coalition force withdrawal, BLUFOR C2 collapse, and OPFOR fait-accomplish expansion beyond the 0.22 initiative signal modeled — a low-probability convergence.

Depends on: OPFOR achieving a larger initial fait-accomplish than the 0.22 initiative signal modeled; sensitivity re-runs show this alone shifts the primary stalemate probability +10.1 percentage points, but full OPFOR consolidation requires compounding of multiple low-probability conditions.

3. FORCE ASSESSMENT

BLUFOR: US 7th Fleet / Indo-Pacific Coalition (CSG-5 led by USS George Washington CVN-73, CVW-5; cruiser USS Robert Smalls CG-62; destroyers USS Benfold DDG-65, USS Shoup DDG-86; JMSDF surface and submarine elements; Royal Australian Navy FFH/SSG attachments)

Readiness: 76% | NCI: 3/5 | Sig: MEDIUM

Logistics: Class-M at 75%, Class-E at 68%; primary sustainment node at Apra Harbor (Guam) and Yokosuka; resupply corridor through Luzon Strait rated AMBER — interdiction risk assessed HIGH at 55%
+ CVW-5 (F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, EA-18G Growlers) providing organic strike and EW suppression across contested South China Sea sectors | + Aegis BMD aboard USS Robert Smalls and Arleigh Burke-class DDGs providing layered terminal defense against DF-21D/DF-26 threat envelopes | + SSN forward presence (USS Springfield SSN-761 and JMSDF Oyashio-class) enabling undersea ISR and anti-surface strike in the first island chain | + Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) integration via NIFC-CA linking airborne, surface and space sensor networks

OPFOR: PLA South Sea Fleet / PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) / PLAAF; aggregate multi-actor context includes Russian Pacific Fleet SIGINT/ISR support and Iranian Strait of Hormuz pressure as theater diversionary force — NOTE: multi-actor limitation applies, only PLAN/PLARF doctrine is modeled

Readiness: 84% | NCI: 3/5 | Sig: MEDIUM

Logistics: Class-M at 80%, Class-E at 74%; interior lines from Yulin Naval Base (Sanya, Hainan) and Zhanjiang provide short resupply arcs; PLAN replenishment ship CNS Hulunhu (Type 901) assigned; internal corridor interdiction risk LOW at 30%
+ PLARF DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod-4) anti-ship ballistic missiles and DF-26 intermediate-range systems providing A2/AD coverage across the South China Sea and into the Philippine Sea — Systems Destruction Warfare targeting BLUFOR C4ISR and sensor nodes ahead of platform engagement | + CNS Shandong (CV-17) CSG with J-15 strike fighters providing organic carrier-based air power from Yulin; CNS Fujian (CV-18, EMALS-equipped) achieving initial operational capability with KJ-600 AEW

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Force saturation sinks; 60% modeled iteration not degraded sustained sortie generation within 72–96 hours ! Coalition consensus latency: ROE alignment across US, Japanese, and Australian national authorities introduces decision cycle lag at critical escalation thresholds	with PL-12 and YJ-18 providing layered threat air defense and long range surface strike (YJ-18 ASCM) + PLA Submarine Force Type 093B SSN and Type 039C AIP-SSK providing undersea attrition and ISR in contested littoral zones ! Blue-water sustainment depth limited for CNS Fujian CSG — extended far-sea operations still reliant on mainland support infrastructure per open-source assessments ! Joint interoperability between PLARF, PLAAF, and PLAN remains a doctrinal stress point; systems-confrontation execution dependent on PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) space/cyber layer remaining intact

4. TERRAIN & THEATER ANALYSIS

Dominant Terrain	Open deep-water maritime theater — South China Sea (Nanhai) basin averaging 1,500m depth in central zones, with contested shallow-reef features (Spratly Island chain, ~8.0°N 114.0°E) providing OPFOR forward basing and ISR picket positions; Luzon Strait (20.5°N 121.5°E) and Malacca Strait (1.3°N 103.8°E) form the primary maritime ingress/egress chokepoints constraining BLUFOR logistical reinforcement
Movement Friction	Open maritime domain presents low trafficability friction for surface maneuver but HIGH friction for ISR-denied transit corridors within the DF-21D/DF-26 engagement envelope (~1,500 km radius from Hainan), constraining BLUFOR standoff and forcing dependence on SSN and long-range air assets for access
Weather Modifier	Southwest monsoon season (August) generates sea states 3–4 with 2–3m swells and intermittent squall lines across the central SCS, reducing fixed-wing sortie generation by an estimated 10–15% and degrading VBSS/amphibious operations; typhoon genesis risk in the Philippine Sea (120–135°E) adds non-trivial operational pause probability within the 3–4 day modeling window
Infrastructure Risk	Yulin Naval Base submarine pens (18.2°N 109.5°E) and Fiery Cross Reef (9.55°N 114.08°E) military airstrip are high-value OPFOR nodes; Apra Harbor (Guam, 13.44°N 144.65°E) and Clark Air Base (15.18°N 120.56°E) are BLUFOR critical logistics nodes exposed to long-range PLARF strike

5. MOST PROBABLE COURSE OF ACTION: CONTESTED INTERDICTION: COALITION MARITIME BLOCKADE OF CHINA — LUZON STRAIT / SOUTH CHINA SEA APPROACH AXIS

A US-led coalition (Japan, Australia, India as contributing partners) initiates a maritime blockade of Chinese energy and commercial sea lanes at the Luzon Strait and Malacca Strait chokepoints, aiming to impose economic coercion on Beijing short of direct territorial assault. PLA Southern Theater Command and Eastern Theater Command respond immediately with Active Defense — operationally offensive strikes against coalition ISR and naval surface combatants — producing a contested stalemate within 3–4 days as neither side achieves decisive sea control.

WHAT HAPPENS, IN ORDER
On D+0, the coalition declares a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) along the first island chain from the Luzon Strait southwest to the Natuna Islands, and USS George Washington (CVN-73) CSG — already transiting the South

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clean C2 advantage, immediately executes its Systems Destruction warfare doctrine: within the first 12 hours of D+1, H-6K bombers carrying YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship missiles launch from Hainan (Lingshui Air Base) against coalition surface combatants patrolling east of Scarborough Shoal, while PLA Rocket Force DF-21D salvos are placed on read-alert to hold the carrier strike group at risk beyond the 1,000 nm denial envelope — this early OPFOR peak (phase-strength multiplier 1.1) is the high-water mark of Chinese offensive initiative. By D+2, coalition F-35C strikes from CVN-73 and RAAF F/A-18F sorties out of RMAF Butterworth suppress PLA forward sensor networks at Fiery Cross Reef and Scarborough Shoal, degrading the over-the-horizon targeting picture that feeds DF-21D fire-control, but BLUFOR's 55% resupply-corridor interdiction risk materializes as a PLA submarine (Type 093B Shang-class) conducts an approach on the coalition logistics vessel track east of the Luzon Strait, forcing a corridor reroute that delays Class-M resupply by approximately 18 hours. D+3 sees the campaign reach operational equilibrium: coalition blockade vessels hold the Luzon Strait choke but cannot push west of Scarborough Shoal without unacceptable exposure to land-based fires, while OPFOR's Phase 2 momentum decays (multiplier drops to 1.05) as YJ-12 magazine depth and H-6K sortie sustainability are pressured by coalition SEAD; the LER of 0.73 — favoring OPFOR on a fractional-loss basis — reflects that BLUFOR absorbed more proportional attrition in the surface-force exchange than it inflicted. By D+4, political strain (mean index 14.6/100) remains well below collapse on both sides, neither force has been rendered combat-ineffective (peak attrition 41.5%, well short of the 55% breakpoint threshold), and the operation terminates in a Contested Stalemate: the MEZ is nominally in place but porous, Chinese energy shipping has been disrupted but not severed, and both sides redeploy to consolidated defensive postures pending diplomatic engagement.

Phase 1: Phase 1 — MEZ Declaration & Coalition Force Positioning

D+0 → D+1 — **BLUFOR Coalition** dominates | Concept: Joint All-Domain ISR Shaping / Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)

Coalition declares Maritime Exclusion Zone at the Luzon Strait and surges CVN-73 CSG into blocking position northeast of Scarborough Shoal, supported by JMSDF Flotilla 2 and Australian surface combatants. ISR packages — including MQ-4C Triton from Andersen AFB Guam and P-8A Poseidon from RAAF Darwin — establish cueing on PLA naval surface and subsurface activity across the South China Sea.

Logistics: Class-M MEDIUM, Class-E LOW — positioning phase, ordnance expenditure minimal Attrition: BLUFOR 2–5%, OPFOR 1–3% — mostly friction and posturing

- D+0H6 MEZ Declaration Broadcast — Luzon Strait [declaration] (N/A) — Coalition formally declares Maritime Exclusion Zone; commercial shipping warned off the Luzon Strait corridor, triggering immediate PRC diplomatic protest and PLA Southern Theater Command readiness elevation.
- D+0H8 CVN-73 CSG Pivot to Blockade Station [naval_op] (N/A) — CVN-73 and escorts reposition northeast of Scarborough Shoal to anchor the northern MEZ enforcement line, establishing a surface-fire umbrella across the Luzon Strait.
- D+0H12 MQ-4C Triton ISR Orbit Established [air] (N/A) — High-altitude persistent ISR orbit over central South China Sea cues coalition surface units on PLA surface combatants sortied from Yulin Naval Base, Hainan.
- D+1H2 PLA Southern Theater Cyber Probe — Coalition C2 [cyber] (Cyber intrusion / EW jamming) — Initial reconnaissance-grade intrusion attempts against coalition SATCOM relay and Link-16 architecture; no operational degradation confirmed but coalition NCI monitoring elevated.
- D+1H6 JMSDF Flotilla 2 Surge Southward from Yokosuka [naval_op] (N/A) — Two Maya-class destroyers and a Taigei-class submarine sortie south through the Ryukyu island chain to reinforce the MEZ's northern flank and extend coalition ASW coverage.

→ **USS George Washington CSG (CVN-73 / CVW-5)** [Fleet] (BLUFOR) OR:76%

→ **JMSDF Destroyer Flotilla 2 (Maya DDG / Taigei SS)** [Fleet] (BLUFOR) OR:82%

→ **PLA Southern Theater Surface/Sub Force (Yulin Naval Base)** [Fleet] (OPFOR) OR:84%

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D+1 → D+3 — **OPFOR — PLA Southern/Eastern Theater** dominates | Concept: Systems Destruction Warfare (体系破击战) — Joint Firepower Strike; A2/AD via DF-21D/DF-26; SEAD/DEAD counter-response

PLA executes Systems Destruction Warfare targeting coalition C4ISR nodes and surface combatants: H-6K bombers from Lingshui Air Base (Hainan) fire YJ-12 anti-ship missiles against coalition surface groups east of Scarborough Shoal, while a Type 093B submarine conducts an interdiction approach on the coalition logistics corridor east of Luzon, and PLA Rocket Force DF-21D units in Guangdong elevate to launch-ready posture. Coalition responds with F-35C SEAD strikes against Fiery Cross Reef sensor arrays and coalition EW aircraft (EA-18G Growlers) suppress PLA fire-control radars, degrading the targeting chain that sustains OPFOR's area-denial umbrella.

Logistics: Class-E HIGH (OPFOR — missile expenditure); Class-M MEDIUM BLUFOR (rerouting from sub threat) Attrition: BLUFOR 12–18%, OPFOR 8–14% — peak exchange rate, LER 0.73 reflects BLUFOR absorbs higher proportional loss in surface combatant exposure

- D+1H18 H-6K YJ-12 Strike — Coalition Surface Group, East Scarborough [strike] (YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship missile) — Salvo of YJ-12 missiles engages coalition destroyer screen; coalition SM-2/SM-6 intercepts partially successful — one Arleigh Burke-class destroyer (USS Benfold DDG-65) sustains topside damage, degrading AAW capacity.
- D+2H4 Type 093B Approach on Coalition Logistics Corridor [naval_op] (YU-6 torpedo / approach posture) — Coalition P-8A detects Type 093B approach on logistics vessel track east of Luzon; coalition reroutes supply corridor 200nm east, imposing an 18-hour Class-M resupply delay to the CVN-73 screen.
- D+2H10 F-35C SEAD Strike — Fiery Cross Reef Sensor Arrays [strike] (AGM-88E AARGM / JDAM) — Coalition F-35C package destructs PLA over-the-horizon radar node and HF communication relay on Fiery Cross Reef, degrading OPFOR targeting data for DF-21D fire-control by approximately 40% per assessment.
- D+2H20 DF-21D Launch-Ready Alert — Guangdong Province [strike] (DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (alert posture — not launched)) — PLA Rocket Force DF-21D brigades in Guangdong elevated to operational-ready; political authorization for launch withheld — functions as escalatory signal constraining CVN-73's operating depth beyond 900nm.
- **PLA Rocket Force DF-21D Brigade (Guangdong)** [Brigade] (OPFOR) OR:84%
- **RAAF No. 1 Squadron F/A-18F (RMAF Butterworth detachment)** [Squadron] (BLUFOR) OR:75%
- **PLA Navy Type 093B SSN (Shang II class)** [Battalion] (OPFOR) OR:84%

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D+3 → D+4 — **CONTESTED** dominates | Concept: Culmination / Operational Pause — Joint All-Domain Consolidation (BLUFOR); Active Defense static hold (OPFOR)

Neither side can advance its position decisively: the coalition holds the Luzon Strait MEZ enforcement line but cannot project west of Scarborough Shoal under residual DF-21D threat, while PLA offensive momentum decays as YJ-12 magazine depth is attrited and H-6K sortie rates are suppressed by coalition SEAD; peak modeled attrition reaches 41.5% of initial strength across both forces, well short of the 55% combat-ineffectiveness breakpoint. Political strain on both sides remains low (mean index 14.6/100), and both commands redeploy to consolidated defensive postures pending diplomatic engagement — producing the computed primary outcome of Contested Stalemate at 56.3%.

Logistics: Class-E MEDIUM (residual air defense expenditure); Class-M LOW — tempo reduction Attrition: BLUFOR 4–8% incremental, OPFOR 3–6% incremental — declining exchange as tempo falls

- D+3H8 Coalition MEZ Enforcement Line Stabilizes — Luzon Strait Hold [naval_op] (N/A) — Coalition surface combatants establish persistent enforcement posture across Luzon Strait; PLA surface group maintains stand-off east of Scarborough Shoal — geographic stalemate crystallizes.
 - D+3H14 PLA H-6K Sortie Rate Decline — Sustainment Constraint [air] (H-6K / YJ-12 (depleted posture)) — OPFOR sortie rate from Lingshui AB drops by estimated 60% as YJ-12 magazine depth is degraded; PLA shifts to defensive combat air patrol posture over Hainan and the Paracel Islands.
 - D+4 Both Sides Redeploy to Consolidated Defensive Hold [declaration] (N/A) — Campaign terminates in operational stasis — blockade MEZ nominally enforced but p ously contested; diplomatic back-channels activated; computed primary outcome (Contested Stalemate, 56.3%) confirmed.
- **USS George Washington CSG — MEZ Enforcement Hold [Fleet] (BLUFOR) OR:68%**
- **PLA Southern Theater Surface Group — Scarborough Stand-Off Hold [Fleet] (OPFOR) OR:74%**

6. LOGISTICS ASSESSMENT

Class-M Days 6	Class-E Days 4	Interdiction Risk HIGH
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BLUFOR Corridor: Primary: Yokosuka (Japan) → Apra Harbor (Guam) → Luzon Strait → South China Sea operating area; secondary: Clark Air Base (Philippines) for CASEVAC and expeditionary fuel. Corridor assessed AMBER — 55% modeled interdiction risk from PLARF conventional strike and PLAN submarine interdiction compresses effective resupply windows to night/low-emissions transits only

OPFOR Corridor: Interior-line corridor from Yulin Naval Base (Sanya, Hainan, 18.2°N 109.5°E) and Zhanjiang Fleet Base (21.2°N 110.4°E) via sheltered SCS inshore routes to forward reef installations; Type 901 fast combat support ships provide at-sea replenishment; interdiction risk LOW at 30% given A2/AD umbrella coverage

⚠ At Risk: Apra Harbor, Guam (13.44°N 144.65°E) — BLUFOR primary ammunition and fuel hub; within DF-26 intermediate-range strike envelope, Fiery Cross Reef airstrip (9.55°N 114.08°E) — OPFOR forward air-defense and ISR node; highest-priority BLUFOR precision strike target in Phase 1

7. CYBER / EW ASSESSMENT

Cyber Threat Level: HIGH | **NCI Trajectory:** Both sides enter at NCI 3; OPFOR SSF cyber operations targeting BLUFOR space-based ISR relay nodes and NIFC-CA tactical data links may drive BLUFOR NCI to 4 by D+2 if counter-cyber response is delayed; OPFOR NCI may degrade from 3 toward 4 if BLUFOR EA-18G Growler jamming and TLAM strikes against PLA SSF ground relay nodes achieve Phase 1 objectives | **Counter-Battery Risk:** PLARF mobile DF-21D and DF-26 TEL units operating from dispersed inland Hainan and Guangdong positions present high survivability; BLUFOR counter-battery suppression requires F-35 or B-21 penetrating strike against hardened TEL dispersal areas — a non-trivial ROE authorization threshold that introduces command decision lag

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mapping of BLUFOR CSG radar emissions and Link-16 traffic, enabling PLA SSF targeting of NIP-CCA network nodes, Luzon Strait undersea cable corridor: PLA cyber assets assessed capable of degrading US-Japan undersea communication redundancy, raising BLUFOR NCI from 3 toward 4 if cable interdiction succeeds

8. KEY DECISION POINTS

Day	Decision Event & Options	Impact	Rationale
D+1	POTUS authorization of offensive strike against PLA surface combatants inside Chinese-claimed 12nm territorial waters around occupied features A: Authorize strikes within 12nm: forces PLA surface action groups to withdraw or be attrited, improving BLUFOR corridor access — but risks triggering CMC authorization of PLARF DF-21D/DF-26 strikes on Guam or Yokosuka and elevating the 7.1% escalation probability bucket. B: Restrict strikes to international waters only: preserves escalation discipline and coalition cohesion but cedes the tactical initiative to OPFOR, sustaining or worsening the 55% BLUFOR resupply-corridor interdiction risk.	CRITICAL POTUS / National Command Authority	The ROE boundary at 12nm is the single most consequential decision gate in this campaign; it determines whether the engagement remains a contested maritime dispute or becomes a direct strike on Chinese sovereign-claimed territory, crossing the CMC's stated red lines.
D+2	INDOPACOM commander decision to commit USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) from CONUS work-up to theater versus holding in reserve A: Forward-deploy TR CSG to Philippine Sea: doubles carrier aviation mass, improves BLUFOR operational readiness from 76% toward parity with OPFOR 84%, and signals escalatory resolve — improving the BLUFOR Operational Victory probability (35.2% baseline). B: Hold TR in ready reserve: preserves strategic depth for a longer campaign or second theater contingency, but leaves the GW CSG as the sole carrier strike asset in-theater with no carrier presence gap cover if GW requires battle damage repair.	HIGH INDOPACOM Commander / SecDef	With USS George Washington the sole carrier in the AOR as of mid-August 2026 and already transiting toward the Middle East relief mission, the decision to surge a replacement or reinforcing carrier is the most time-sensitive force-generation choice of the campaign.
D+2	PLA Southern Theater Command decision to activate DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile regiment against coalition surface action groups A: Activate DF-21D/DF-26 strike packages: forces BLUFOR carrier groups to retreat beyond the second island chain, degrading air superiority and ISR coverage — consistent with RED-2 'Asymmetric Interdiction' COA that drives	CRITICAL CMC / PLA Southern Theater Command Commander	DF-21D/DF-26 employment is the single most asymmetric lever available to OPFOR and the primary driver of the RED-2 optimal-adversary outcome; its use or restraint bifurcates the campaign along its two most divergent paths.

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B: Withhold ballistic missile employment: preserves escalation space and diplomatic off-ramps, limiting the engagement to surface and air forces; OPFOR accepts reduced A2/AD effectiveness in exchange for avoiding alliance-galvanizing events.

D+1	Philippine government decision to invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty and formally request US kinetic support A: Invoke MDT and request kinetic support: legitimizes BLUFOR combat operations under Article V, enables Philippine air and naval forces to integrate fully into the coalition ISR-strike network, and strengthens coalition political sustainability above the mean strain index of 14.6/100. B: Limit request to diplomatic and deterrent presence only: preserves Manila's negotiating space with Beijing but constrains BLUFOR to presence operations, effectively matching the current contested-stalemate baseline without improving BLUFOR's 76% effective readiness.	HIGH Philippine President / DFA-DND	Philippine MDT invocation is the political condition that converts BLUFOR from a freedom-of-navigation presence force into a treaty-obligated combat force, with direct effects on coalition cohesion and the allied-commitment sensitivity factor.
D+?	BLUFOR theater commander decision on timing of SEAD/DEAD strikes against Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef air defense nodes A: Execute SEAD/DEAD in Phase 1 (D+0): suppresses HQ-9/HHQ-16 SAM coverage over contested sea lanes, enabling F-35C and F/A-18E/F freedom of action — front-loads attrition consistent with the phase strength curve peak at Phase 1. B: Defer SEAD/DEAD to Phase 2: preserves surprise and reduces early escalation optics but allows OPFOR to improve NCI and disperse assets; OPFOR's 84% effective readiness baseline advantages compound if BLUFOR delays the attrition contest.	HIGH INDOPACOM Air Component Commander (COMAFFOR)	The phase strength curve is front-loaded (1.0 → 1.1 → 1.05), meaning OPFOR peaks in Phase 2; early SEAD/DEAD is the primary mechanism by which BLUFOR can contest that peak before OPFOR's systems-destruction warfare campaign degrades BLUFOR C4ISR to a level that forecloses the 35.2% victory branch.

9. SENSITIVITY FACTORS

Factor	Impact if Changed	Probability Shift
Coalition/allied force commitment withdrawn or delayed	Withdrawal or delay of allied basing and escort forces removes the distributed sensor-shooter network that keeps BLUFOR logistics corridors viable, collapsing BLUFOR's resupply redundancy and pushing the primary outcome from Contested	Shifts primary outcome probability +9.9 percentage points (computed: 56.5% → 66.4% across 20,000 re-run

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OPFOR logistics interdiction fully succeeds	Even full BLUFOR interdiction success produces a negligible shift in primary outcome probability across re-run iterations, indicating that within a 3-4 day campaign the PLA's pre-positioned stockpiles at hardened island bases insulate OPFOR from logistics pressure before culmination.	Shifts primary outcome probability +0 percentage points (computed: 56.5% -> 56.4% across 20,000 re-run iterations)
Escalation control breaks down (miscalculation risk doubles)	If miscalculation risk doubles — e.g., a PLAN surface action group misidentifies a coalition ISR aircraft as a strike package and engages — the probability of Major Escalation Beyond Modeled Scope rises sharply, drawing probability mass from the Stalemate bucket and materially raising the 7.1% escalation ceiling.	Shifts primary outcome probability -4 percentage points (computed: 56.5% -> 52.4% across 20,000 re-run iterations)
OPFOR achieves a larger initial fait-accompli than modeled	A larger fait-accompli — analogous to PLA forces fully consolidating Scarborough Shoal or a Spratly feature before the coalition can respond — grants OPFOR a defended baseline that is operationally and diplomatically costly to reverse, pushing the primary outcome sharply toward OPFOR Consolidation and away from stalemate.	Shifts primary outcome probability +10.1 percentage points (computed: 56.5% -> 66.5% across 20,000 re-run iterations)

10. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIR)

Priority	Intelligence Gap	Recommended Collection
PIR	Real-time disposition and readiness state of PLAN Type 055 Renhai-class destroyers assigned to PLA Southern Theater Command, specifically whether Zunyi or sister hulls are forward-deployed to Yulin or to Spratly island anchorages at H-Hour	SIGINT (J-band fire-control radar emission monitoring), IMINT (commercial SAR and NRO tasking of Yulin and Fiery Cross anchorages), MASINT (propulsion acoustic signatures via SOSUS-successor architecture)
PIR	Actual operational readiness and warhead loading status of PLARF DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile brigades (61 Base / former Second Artillery) — specifically whether mobile TELs have departed garrison for dispersal, which would indicate CMC has crossed a pre-launch authorization threshold	IMINT (NRO tasking of known DF-21D garrison sites in Guangdong and Hainan), SIGINT (TEL-associated data-link and radar emissions), HUMINT (PLA Rocket Force logistics and fueling activity indicators)
PIR	PLA Southern Theater Command's cyber and EW order of battle — specifically which units of the Strategic Support Force's Network Systems Department are assigned to this theater and whether pre-positioned implants have already been seeded in coalition C4ISR networks	SIGINT (CYBER — NSA/CSS joint collection against PLA SSF network intrusion signatures), HUMINT (liaison with Five Eyes partners for corroborating technical intelligence), OSINT (PLA SSF unit-level publication and exercise reporting)
IR	Fuel and ammunition stock levels at Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef logistics nodes — specifically whether forward pre-positioning since April 2026 STC patrol intensification has brought stores to wartime sustainment levels	IMINT (commercial optical and SAR analysis of pier-side barge and cargo activity), OSINT (shipping AIS anomaly analysis for vessels transiting Spratly anchorages without broadcasting position)
PIR	Internal Chinese political signaling from CMC to theater commanders — whether Xi Jinping has issued a 'bottom line' directive that constrains or expands OPFOR escalation authority, which would determine whether the	SIGINT (senior leadership communications — NSA/GCHQ), HUMINT (diplomatic back-channels and third-country liaison reporting from nations with Beijing presence), OSINT (PLA Daily and Xinhua

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Theater Friction Index: 3/5 | **Host-Nation Alignment:** HIGH alignment with Philippines as treaty ally under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty; MEDIUM alignment with Vietnam given its independent foreign policy posture and ongoing direct maritime disputes with China that create parallel but not joint interest; LOW formal alignment with Malaysia and Indonesia despite shared concern over PLAN presence.

ROE Constraints: BLUFOR Rules of Engagement require positive target identification and proportionality review before any kinetic strike within or adjacent to Chinese-claimed territorial waters around occupied Spratly and Paracel features, imposing a material engagement delay that constrains Phase 1 tempo and advantages OPFOR's pre-positioned defensive posture.

Civilian Infra at Risk: Commercial shipping lanes through the South China Sea (estimated 30-40% of global seaborne trade) — any enforced exclusion zone or kinetic engagement risks rerouting or halting container, LNG, and bulk cargo transits, with immediate cascading economic effects on Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, Philippine civilian fishing communities operating within the Kalayaan Island Group — exposure to naval and aerial operations in the Spratly Island sub-theater creates direct risk to livelihoods and physical safety of roughly 4,000 registered Philippine fishermen active in the area

12. ENGINE ASSESSMENT (ICD-203) — AI-GENERATED, NOT A HUMAN ANALYST JUDGEMENT

We assess with MEDIUM-HIGH confidence that the most probable outcome of this campaign within the 3-4 day modeled window is a Contested Stalemate (56.3%), driven by the structural asymmetry between OPFOR's superior initial effective readiness (84% vs. BLUFOR's 76%), OPFOR's lower resupply-corridor interdiction risk (30% vs. 55%), and the front-loaded phase strength curve that allows PLA Southern Theater Command forces to contest the operational environment aggressively in Phases 1 and 2 before BLUFOR can establish the air superiority and ISR overmatch that Joint All-Domain Operations doctrine requires. The Loss Exchange Ratio of 0.73 — unfavorable to BLUFOR — confirms that OPFOR is generating disproportionate combat effectiveness relative to forces committed, consistent with PLA Systems Destruction Warfare doctrine targeting BLUFOR C4ISR nodes ahead of platforms; however, peak OPFOR attrition across all one million iterations reached only 41.5% of initial strength against a 55% combat-ineffectiveness threshold, indicating the model's phase structure does not produce attrition deep enough to test breakpoint conditions — this metric is therefore uninformative for this run, and deep-attrition effects over a longer campaign must be assessed separately. The TSS standard deviation of 6.04 and negative skewness (-0.146) indicate the distribution is slightly left-tailed, meaning BLUFOR operational victories are achievable but asymmetrically difficult to reach from the current force posture baseline. The single most dangerous assumption in this analysis is that the RED-2 'Asymmetric Interdiction and Escalation Leverage' COA remains the adversary's optimal but unselected strategy — a planning convenience rather than a planning certainty. If the CMC authorizes DF-21D/DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile employment against the George Washington CSG in Phase 1 or 2, BLUFOR victory probability collapses from 35.2% to 5.3% per the optimal-adversary re-run; this single decision by PLA leadership would invalidate the current assessment entirely and shift the modal outcome toward either Major Escalation (currently 7.1%) or OPFOR Strategic Consolidation (currently 1.4%). The political sustainability mean strain index of 14.6/100 is low enough that domestic and coalition political cohesion is not a near-term limiting factor, but this is a campaign-opening snapshot, not a calibrated collapse threshold; a politically galvanizing event such as a coalition aircraft being downed over international waters could rapidly alter that index. For the next 72 hours, the theater commander should prioritize three actions: null, task NRO and NSA collection assets immediately against PLARF DF-21D TEL garrison sites in

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to accelerate USS Theodore Roosevelt's deployment timeline and pre-position the strike group within operational range of the Philippine Sea by D+3, eliminating the carrier coverage gap created by USS George Washington's transit toward the Middle East relief mission; third, convene an emergency ROE review with OSD General Counsel and State Department Legal Adviser to pre-authorize expedited proportionality determinations for SEAD/DEAD strikes against Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef air defense nodes, removing the engagement-delay constraint before Phase 1 operations require it.

13. ANALYST ASSESSMENT — HUMAN

No human analyst assessment has been entered for this product. The engine assessment in Section 12 is AI-generated and has not been reviewed, endorsed, or supplemented by a human analyst.

14. DOTMLPF-P CAPABILITY DELTA MATRIX

Domains marked *COMPUTED* are derived from engine state and carry their evidence. Domains marked *REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT* are outside what an aggregate-force model can measure and are deliberately left empty rather than populated with plausible-sounding text.

Domain	Source	Finding / Evidence
DOCTRINE	COMPUTED	Coordination friction materially degrades effectiveness at this operational complexity. — Complexity multiplier 1.35x baseline friction (simultaneous theaters and/or coalition operation).
ORGANIZATION	COMPUTED	Command and control integrity degraded; fires effectiveness reduced accordingly. — BLUFOR NCI 3/5 vs OPFOR 3/5; NCI is linked to fires effectiveness, not cosmetic.
TRAINING	REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT	The engine does not model individual or collective training readiness. Assess proficiency gaps against the phase structure above.
MATERIEL	COMPUTED	Sustainment degradation over the campaign is a limiting factor. — BLUFOR logistics health 75% initial, fragility multiplier 0.8. NOTE: the engine models aggregate sustainment only — per-munition magazine depletion is NOT computed and must be assessed separately.
LEADERSHIP & EDUCATION	REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT	Not modelled. Assess command decision latency and delegation authority against the decision points in the narrative.
PERSONNEL	REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT	No DSCA diversion was modelled in this run. Assess personnel availability and civil-support obligations if applicable.
FACILITIES	COMPUTED	Force closure is constrained by lift throughput and lines of communication are exposed. — TPFDD Phase 1 closure 55% (trans-oceanic (Indo-Pacific) power projection); BLUFOR corridor interdiction risk 55%.
POLICY	REQUIRES ANALYST INPUT	No activation delay was modelled. Assess statutory authorities, ROE constraints and release timelines.

4 domain(s) derived from engine state; 4 require analyst input and are deliberately left unpopulated rather than filled with plausible-sounding text.

15. JELC REPRODUCIBILITY TRACE

Field	Value
Engine version	real-montecarlo-v5-wase-integrated
Doctrine set	2026.08-1
Master seed	425580616
CPN seed	2271012433

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Iterations executed	1,000,000
Reproducibility	Re-run with master_seed 425580616 and identical parameters to reproduce every figure bit-for-bit.
Variance control	Common Random Numbers on all sensitivity and Red-COA comparisons; paired-run difference exactly 0.00pp.
Convergence	Gelman-Rubin R-hat = 1 across 4 independently seeded chains (Strong convergence).
Multi-theater method	Single-theater scenario — bottleneck evaluation not applicable.
Red cell	Adversary optimal COA RED-2 (Asymmetric Interdiction & Escalation Leverage) drives BLUFOR victory probability to 5.3%, selected by argmin over independently computed batches.
Verification status: Reproducibility, variance control and convergence are VERIFIED by construction and independently checkable using the procedure in the methodology document. Accreditation status is NOT asserted by this system and must be determined by the reviewing authority.	